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EXCUSE AND JUSTIFICATION IN THE LAW OF FAIR USE: 
TRANSACTION COSTS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN 
PART OF THE STORY 
by WENDY J. GORDON* 
INTRODUCTION 
In American copyright law, the doctrine of "fair use" has long been 
problematic. Every plausible litmus test that might simplify the "fair use" 
inquiry has proven inadequate,1 and copyright commentators have long 
*Copyright© 2002, 2003 by Wendy J. Gordon. Professor of Law & Paul J. Liacos 
Scholar in Law, Boston University School of Law. This essay is adapted from an 
article of the same title (but different subtitle) in The Commodification of Infor-
mation 149-92 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., Kluwer Law In-
ternational 2002). For helpful comments I am grateful to workshop participants at 
the American Law & Economics Association, the Society for Economic Research 
on Copyright Issues (SERCI), the University of Arizona, the Australian National 
University Faculty of Law, the Boston University Faculty Workshop and the B.U. 
Intellectual Property Discussion Group, the University of California (Berkeley), 
the Cardozo School of Law Conference on Copyright Law as Communications 
Policy, the Cardozo-DePaul First Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Confer-
ence (at DePaul), the Copyright Society of Australia (Sydney), the University of 
Melbourne, St. Catherine's College in the University of Oxford (U.K.), the law 
schools of Rutgers University/Newark, Seton Hall, Stanford, Vanderbilt, and the 
University of Sydney and, of course, the Conference on the Commodification of 
Information at the University of Haifa (Israel). In particular I thank Ed Baker, 
Linda Bui, Tyler Cowen, Tamar Frankel, Mike Harper, Gary Lawson, Mark Lem-
ley, David Lyons, Mike Meurer, Neil Netanel, David Nimmer, Richard Posner, 
Margaret Jane Radin, Megan Richardson, Anne Seidman, Bob Seidman, Seana 
Shiffrin, Ken Simons, Avishalom Tor, David Vaver and the members of my semi-
nar in intellectual property theory. Students Michael Burling, Peter Cancelmo and 
Alisa Hacker provided able research assistance. 
1 Fair use is a judicially-created doctrine from the nineteenth century that per-
mits some uses of copyrighted material despite the lack of the copyright 
holder's consent. The doctrine was given statutory recognition in the Copy-
right Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (listing factors to "include" in 
consideration of fair use). See also id. § 101 (indicating that, "The terms 
'including' and 'such as' are illustrative and not !imitative."). 
A court will deem a defendant's copying or other use of the plaintiffs work 
"fair" when, by and large, the use is non-commercial, involves a quantita-
tively small amount of copying, serves the public interest, and causes little 
or no harm to the owner of the copyright. See id. § 107. Yet there are cases 
that give the lie to each of these factors standing alone: Cases where "fair 
use" was found potentially available for a use that is commercial, Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994); for a use that copies 
100% of the copyrighted work, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 203 
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sought an algorithm or heuristic to lend predictability and conceptual co-
herence to the doctrine. Twenty years ago, I published in this Journal an 
article entitled Fair Use as Market Failure, which suggested that the key to 
understanding the protean forms of "fair use" could best be found in the 
notion of market failure.2 That 1982 article has been often misapplied, by 
both courts and commentators. I am pleased to publish in the Fiftieth An-
niversary issue of this Journal a clarification of my position on market fail-
ure and fair use. 
Most importantly, I want to make explicit that markets do not "fail" 
merely when transaction costs are so high that a potential seller and buyer 
fail to meet.3 The point of "market failure" as a category is not to cata-
Ct. Cl. 74, 89-90 (1973), aff d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 
(1975) (per curiam); for a use of trivial aesthetic or public importance, Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440 (1983) 
(copying of, inter alia, television entertainment programs); and for a use 
that harmfully diminishes the demand for the copyrighted work, cf Fisher v. 
Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437-38 (9th Cir. 1986) (for fair use purposes, only sub-
stitutional harm is relevant; other kinds of harm do not weigh against fair 
use). Similarly, when the Supreme Court put great stress on the unpub-
lished nature of a plaintiff's work, Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation En-
ters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), Congress fairly quickly passed an amendment to 
the fair use statute to clarify that the unpublished status of a work should 
not be determinative. See the last sentence of 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
2 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 CoLuM. L. REV. 1600 
(1982) [hereinafter Fair Use as Market Failure], reprinted in 1 THE EcoNOM-
1cs OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 377-434 (Ruth Towse & Rudi W. Holz-
hauer eds., 2002), and in 30 J. CoPYR. Soc'y 253-326 (1983). 
3 The typical misunderstanding has been to interpret me as arguing that "the 
impossibility of arriving at bargains [is] the essential justification for the 
doctrine of fair use." David Lindsay, The Future of the Fair Dealing De-
fense to Copyright Infringement 62, Research Paper No 12, University of 
Melbourne Centre for Media, Communications and Information Technol-
ogy Law, Nov. 2000); accord Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Prop-
erty Rights and Contract In The "Newtonian" World Of On-Line Commerce, 
12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130-31(1997). To the contrary, of course, the 
impossibility of arriving at bargains is only one of the types of market fail-
ure I explored in Fair Use as Market Failure. Other types of market failure 
can arise, inter alia, in the presence of nonmonetizable interests, anti-dis-
semination motives, and positive externalities generated by users. See id. at 
1630-35. 
Some courts and commentators understand and apply the original analysis 
well. Lydia Pallas Loren is one. But as she suggests, many courts as well as 
some scholars have taken the erroneously narrow view of the market failure 
defense. Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach To 
Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTEL. PROP. L. 1, 
26-27 (1997). I applaud most of the discussion in the Loren article as help-
ing to avert further misunderstanding, and hope that the instant essay will 
help clarify further. 
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logue individual buyers' and sellers' private frustrations. Rather, the con-
cept of "market failure" provides tools for economists and other observers 
to assess when privately motivated deals can or cannot be relied upon to 
suit public ends. 
Thus, in the literature of law and economics, the term "market fail-
ure" refers to the failure of the Invisible Hand that Adam Smith hoped 
could reconcile private motives and public goals. It is the Invisible Hand 
that makes us comfortable relying on markets to allocate our resources, 
comfortable assuming that a property owner's decisions deserve defer-
ence, comfortable that a private person's choices will be socially beneficial 
even though no government official oversees what occurs. It is the Invisi-
ble Hand that in large part justifies the usual legal rule making someone's 
intentional use of another person's property prima facie actionable - ac-
tionable without needing a judge to decide whether or not the uncon-
sented use is socially undesirable. When we see a palsy in the Invisible 
Hand, however, we need to reconsider that deference. 
Since "market failure" refers to a market's failure to serve social 
goals, such a failure can happen even when participants are bargaining 
face-to-face. For example, consider a potential licensee of a copyrighted 
work, call her Alice, who wishes to adapt an existing book in a controver-
sial way. Assume her adaptation will provide crucial ideas to public dis-
course, but that Alice's book itself is not likely to become a best-seller. 
The revenue she would collect from her book would represent only a small 
portion of the social benefits her adaptation would create. (The benefits 
someone generates but cannot capture are termed "positive externali-
ties.") Consider another potential licensee, call him Ben, who has in mind 
a conventional blockbuster adaptation, a page-turner that will provide lit-
tle in the way of new ideas but heaps in the way of money. When going to 
banks for loans to finance their projects, Alice is likely find that Ben can 
raise more money than she can. When promising payments to the copy-
right owner, Alice is likely to find that Ben can promise more than she 
can. If Ben can "internalize" the benefits his adaptation would generate 
more completely than Alice can, he can and likely will outbid Alice -
even if Alice's adaptation could serve social needs. A market exchange 
has occurred, in that a license has been granted (by the copyright owner to 
Ben). However, the copyright license has been allocated to the wrong 
party. This, too, is "market failure." Thus, "market failure" as a category 
extends well beyond the case of high transaction costs between owner and 
user. 
I here suggest that fair use cases can be usefully separated into two 
categories. Each category marks a set of reasons to think that private mar-
kets will fail to meet social goals. I dub the two sets of reasons "market 
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malfunction" and "inherent limitation." Both can be thought of as forms 
of "market failure" writ large. 
Briefly, the category of "market malfunction" identifies instances 
where economic norms appropriately govern, but which display imperfect 
market conditions (such as significant externalities). This is the category 
most Jaw and economics scholars mean by "market failure." By compari-
son, the category of "inherent limitation" refers to circumstances where 
even under perfect market conditions we cannot rely on markets to func-
tion as socially satisfactory institutions for the distribution of resources. 
These are the many instances where market norms themselves fail to pro-
vide fully suitable criteria for resolving a dispute, instances where we do 
not want money to determine what happens. 
It is often said that babies should not be treated as commodities, nor 
should adult bodies. There may be. occasions when works of authorship, 
too, involve values that should not be subject solely to monetary forces. As 
will appear below, policies regarding commodification can help us distin-
guish when a court should treat a given copyright interaction as appropri-
ately governed by market norms, and when instead the court should treat 
such norms as fully or partly inadequate. 
The distinction between "malfunction" and "inherent limitation" can 
be illuminated by drawing on the distinction between "excuse" and "justi-
fication." That distinction, so far best developed in the context of criminal 
law, is capable of more general application. 
"Excuse" connotes "if only" - if only some discrete fact were differ-
ent, we could apply the law as written. In instances of "market malfunc-
tion" we are in the world of "if only": we would prefer the market to 
govern if only the market could function well, but when it fails to do so 
(because of, e.g., transaction costs), a court may excuse a participant from 
adhering to the usual market rules. Therefore, the "market malfunction" 
category corresponds, in a loose but useful way, to the legal concept of 
"excuse." It is based on the nonappearance of conditions that the gov-
erning model views as normal,4 and is thus a conditional defense. 
By contrast, a defense of "inherent limitation" would not be condi-
tional in this way. If market norms are inherently inadequate in the partic-
ular context, then even were the market to function perfectly, a court 
might approve a departure from market procedures as justified under 
4 Admittedly, the market is never fully "perfect." What counts as market mal-
function is a matter of degree. This too bears a good analogy to the criminal 
law treatment of "excuse." The overall criminal law model assumes persons 
are rational actors who respond to incentives such as fear of imprisonment, 
even though all people are sometimes irrational and sometimes immune 
from incentives. It is only when the divergence from the normal grows great 
enough that someone is declared "insane," that he may be excused for crim-
inal acts he performs. 
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these other norms. Thus, I suggest that this second category of market 
failure is analogous to the established concept of "justification." When we 
come up against the market's inherent limitations, we don't yearn toward 
what the market could do "if only" some fact were changed. We turn to 
other norms. 
(Note the distinction parallels criminal law only in part. Criminal law 
parses "excuse" as pertaining largely to state of mind, and "justification" 
largely to a defendant's act. The way I use the terms, the core of the dis-
tinction is seen more generally: "Excuse" is a matter of factual divergence 
from the standard; "justification" is a matter of norms; and acts can be 
justified or excused.) 
Third, I point out that in all tort cases - and cop'yright infringement 
is no exception - excuse and justification can apply at any of three levels: 
to the defendant's behavior, to the defendant's failure to obtain the plain-
tiffs permission, and/or to the defendant's failure to compensate. (This, 
too, is different from criminal law.) I show how the single "fair use" in-
quiry in fact contains all three inquiries. 
Fourth, I suggest that courts should and do treat cases where a lack of 
permission and compensation are excused (market malfunction) differ-
ently from cases where absence of permission and compensation are justi-
fied (market limitation). The difference in treatment is summarized at the 
end of this Introduction. 
Finally, I argue that significant societal dangers lurk in responding to 
defendants' claims of fair use with judicially created compulsory licenses. 
This latter option - denying the plaintiff an injunction but making the 
defendant pay - may look like a wonderful compromise that satisfies 
both free speech and incentive concerns, but data from psychology and 
behavioral law and economics suggests that it has costs of its own. 
My earlier work, linking fair use generally to notions of market fail-
ure, is consistent with making the proffered distinction between excused 
and justified fair uses.5 Where I diverge from my earlier writing, however, 
is in my current belief that not all reasons for distrusting markets should 
be given the same treatment. 
s As mentioned, in Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, I presented 
"nonmonetizable interests" as a form of market failure. Id. at 1630. As dis-
cussed below, the presence of nonmonetizable interests can constitute a 
"justification" for fair use. In Fair Use as Market Failure, I argued that trans-
action costs high enough to impede bargaining constituted another form of 
market failure. Id. at 1628. As discussed below, the presence of high trans-
action costs between owner and user can constitute an "excuse" for a court 
providing fair use treatment. Thus, the use of the "excuse" and "justifica-
tion" categories refines but does not contradict my earlier definition of the 
market failures that can trigger fair use treatment. 
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Most notably, in my earlier work I had argued that fair use should 
generally be denied if recognizing the defense would cause substantial in-
jury to the copyright owner.6 The presence of substantial injury should 
defeat a claim of fair use, I argued, and I applied this recommendation to 
all cases where market deference was inappropriate, even situations in-
volving nonmonetizable interests (an "inherent limitation" kind of market 
failure). I now recognize that treatment as overbroad.7 Substantial injury 
to the plaintiff is a factor that should be treated differently by the category 
of market malfunction ("excuse"), and by the category of inherent limita-
tion ("justification"). 
I will here argue as follows: 
1. A case of "justification" can occur when we would not object 
if others emulated a defendant's having no permission and/ 
or her having paid no compensation.8 For free speech pur-
poses, for example, it appears actively undesirable to require 
an iconoclast to obtain the permission of the entity she is 
ridiculing. We would want iconoclasts like her to speak9 
without obtaining permission from their targets.10 If so, the 
iconoclast's failure to ask permission is justified.11 
6 Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1618-27 and passim. 
7 One of the important influences stimulating me to rethink this issue was Neil 
W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 
330-31 (1996). I thank Neil Netanel for the excellent and helpful criticism. 
8 Heidi M. Hurd, Propter Honoris Respectum: Justification and Excuse, Wrong-
doing and Culpability, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 1555 (1999) ("A ... 
well-known test of when actions are justified holds that an action is justified 
if and only if we are willing to recommend that others emulate it in similar 
circumstances. In contrast, an action is eligible only for an excuse when we 
wish that the actor had acted differently and hope that others do not emu-
late the actor's unfortunate conduct in the future."). 
9 I am following the convention that uses "speech" to embrace all acts of com-
munication. Nevertheless, for those who identify "speech" with "talking,'' 
please note that quoting from copyrighted works in one's private talk does 
not require permission under copyright law, no matter how extensive the 
quotation may be. That is because "private performance" is outside a copy-
right owner's control. By contrast, giving a public talk is a "public perform-
ance" which is governed by§ 106 of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) 
(2000). 
10 Should the law require the iconoclast to obtain the permission of the person 
whose oeuvre she is attacking, such a requirement would likely block the 
critique altogether, or blunt its point and effectiveness. The target's dislike 
of being attacked is not a technical problem that can be easily cured by 
tweaking institutions or technology. 
11 Issues can arise on the borderline between excuse and justification, as will ap-
pear below. For one example, consider policies of redistribution. One 
scholar arguing that redistribution should be a relevant fair use policy is 
Robert Merges, supra note 2, at 133-36. Conceivably this could give rise to 
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2. For fair use, a potential "excuse" arises when something oc-
curs that we do not want to have emulated - a behavior, 
lack of permission, or lack of compensation - but which we 
allow without imposing liability because of the particular 
facts of that case. A paradigmatic example is presented when 
high transaction costs between owner and possible licensee 
are so large that they swamp any possibility of bargaining.12 
The social good that could be furthered by the blocked 
transaction, coupled with the incapacity of the participants 
to use the market, can "excuse" the defendant from going 
forward without asking permission.13 But if transaction costs 
were lower, we would want the defendant's use to occur only 
if voluntarily licensed by the copyright owner. · 
3. In cases of "excuse," fair use should and does disappear if, 
because of institutional or technological change, the excusing 
circumstances disappear. By contrast, in cases of "justifica-
tion" a change in circumstances would not change the availa-
bility of the fair use defense.14 
4. In cases of "excuse," it is defensible to deny fair use treat-
ment if it would do significant harm to the plaintiff's inter-
ests and to the incentives of similarly situated copyright 
owners. In cases of "justification," however, harm to the 
owner should be given much more limited importance.15 
an "excuse," in the sense that correcting the maldistribution might eliminate 
the fair use. Alternatively, this could be conceptualized as a case of justifica-
tion, where the market's monetary measure will be unable to accomplish 
social ends. 
12 The importance of transaction costs depends on their size relative to the bene-
fits to be reaped from a transaction. A potential license will likely be 
blocked whenever the copyright owner and putative copier face transaction 
costs that are higher than any net gains that could result from a consum-
mated transaction. See Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1627-30. 
13 This is how I interpret the court's decision in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United 
States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74 (1973), affd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 
(1975) (per curiam). See Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2. 
14 The only thing that would change the availability of the defense in cases of 
justification is a change in norms. 
is Please note that point (3), regarding change in circumstance, is true of all "ex-
cuses" by definition. An excuse is a defense based on special circumstances, 
which is applicable only when the circumstances are present. The next fac-
tor discussed - point (4), substantial injury to the copyright owner - is not 
definitional in the same way, and applies to many but not all cases of 
excuse. 
Presenting a full development would be beyond the scope of this summary. 
The article's purpose is to show the connections between fair use, "justifica-
tion," and commodification. 
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The instant essay will explain the relevant concepts, explore the logi-
cal connections between them, and provide some examples. In addition, it 
will use concepts of both excuse and justification to explore a problem 
area that straddles the distinction: attempts by copyright owners to use 
intellectual property law as a tool of private censorship. 
I begin by offering a partial conceptual map of excuse and 
justification. 
I. EXCUSE AND JUSTIFICATION 
In common lawyer's parlance, an act or omission is said to be "justi-
fied" if we would not object to its being emulated.16 An act or omission is 
said to be "excused" if we would not want it to be emulated, but we have 
reasons other than the merits of the act or omission itself to relieve the 
defendant of liability. Thus, one might say that "justifying" an act or omis-
sion goes to the merits of the defendant's choice, while giving the defen-
dant an "excuse" does not go to the merits.17 Usually, an "excuse" arises 
because of some kind of institutional lack of fit between the circumstances 
and what the applicable law seeks to accomplish. 
To illustrate, consider self-defense in the ordinary common law of 
crime. If someone in using reasonable force to repel a violent attack un-
avoidably breaks her attacker's arm, the attacker will not be able to sue 
the arm-breaker successfully for battery, nor will the arm-breaker be crim-
inally liable. Her acts will not give rise to liability because it is desirable for 
innocent parties to defend themselves. The use of reasonable force is 
proper, and what the arm-breaker has done is justified. Even if it is not the 
best thing that she could have done (we may have preferred her to run 
16 See Hurd, supra note 8. Or, as stated in the classic treatment by H.L.A. Hart: 
"In the case of 'justification' what is done is regarded as something which 
the law does not condemn, or even welcomes." H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon 
to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: Es-
sA YS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 13 (1968) (footnote omitted). 
17 For this useful simplification, I am indebted to Tamar Frankel. It allows me to 
sidestep the fascinating question of whether there is some definable es-
sence, other than "not on the merits," that motivates excuses in civil tort 
law. As will appear below, I argue that most "excuses" in the tort of copy-
right are linked to deviations from what would be needed for the neoclassi-
cal Invisible Hand to operate. But as this intuition has a great deal of 
openness, a sidestep is useful. 
In criminal law, it is often argued that "justification" goes to the defendant's 
act, while "excuse" goes to the defendant's culpability as a person. See Hart, 
supra note 16, at 13-14 ("psychological state of the agent"); cf GEORGE 
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 577-78, 734, and chapter 10 (1978) 
(excuse as lack of "accountability" or attribution). In my schema, the acts of 
refusing to pay, or of refusing to seek compensation, can be excused as well 
as justified. 
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away), the action is morally acceptable. We would not object to its being 
emulated by persons similarly situated. 
By contrast, consider an arm-breaker who was delusional in thinking 
she was being attacked. In a criminal trial, she might escape conviction for 
battery, but not because her actions were justified. Rather, the delusional 
arm-breaker might be found "not guilty by reason of insanity." Such a 
verdict reflects an excuse. We do not want her action emulated. Rather, 
the criminal law merely chooses not to impose a criminal sanction because 
of particular circumstances that cause a lack of fit between the defendant's 
state of mind, on the one hand, and, on the other, the purposes and func-
tioning of criminal law and its sanctions. A different result might well be 
reached by a judge applying the civil law of torts, 18 with its different pur-
poses and function. 
If one evaluates the purposes and function of copyright, what do we 
find? Copyright sets up a market system in which, it is hoped, copyright 
owners, publishers, new creators and consumers will enter into transac-
tions which will both disseminate the creative works and provide incen-
tives for their creation.19 Ownership is given to the class of persons -
creators - from whose hands a market will most easily evolve and which 
will result in a desirable degree of internalization.20 It is hoped that the 
18 Many states whose criminal law might excuse the delusional defendant would 
nevertheless impose civil (tort) liability on her. 
19 This standard language of "incentive and dissemination" is sometimes misin-
terpreted. Copyright is granted as a monopoly to subsidize creativity and 
not as a monopoly to subsidize physical production or physical dissemina-
tion. This was true historically as well. The publishers who benefited under 
the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, were those who had paid 
authors for an exclusive right to copy. Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19. 
(1710). Thus, although publisher pressure may have helped that first copy-
right act come into being, the publishers were not subsidized as publishers, 
but rather as persons who had supported the authorial enterprise. 
Had the publishers not paid for copyrights, their mere physical costs of print-
ing and distribution would not have supported a claim for governmental 
aid. Normal competition applies to those physical processes. Copyright does 
not aim to make the physical act of dissemination more profitable than 
other physical processes. Copyright merely aims to encourage the creation 
of works - and the fixed costs of creation having been met, authors can 
then license the newly made works, providing access to the public. 
20 Even if it is decided that the law should adopt a rule of deference to property 
owners, it still remains necessary to specify who is the owner. Who will re-
ceive an ab initio right to use the resource, as compared with the non-own-
ing people who must purchase a privilege to use the resource? From a moral 
perspective, we might want authors and inventors to have initial ownership 
in their intangibles if they deserve ownership. Debate would then center on 
the proper nature and bases of desert. It would be in part empirical (who 
does what?), but mostly normative (what significance should be given to 
what is done?). From a neoclassical economic perspective, however, owner-
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result will maximize social welfare as well as the welfare of the partici-
pants. (Of the many ways to measure welfare, most legal scholars follow 
Judge Posner's classic approach, and seek to "maximize value as measured 
by willingness to pay."21 ) Market transactions are thought a desirable way 
to pursue such maximization because, inter alia, decentralized market ac-
tors such as buyers and sellers have incentives to reveal some of their pref-
erences, and need less data than a centralized entity would need in order 
to operate effectively. Second-guessing individual owners has high dangers 
of inaccuracy, as well as being administratively expensive.22 Thus, enforc-
ing a market system is one of the best ways of being sure that efficiency 
will be achieved, assuming of course that transaction costs are low and 
other conditions of perfect competition are adequately met. Thus, in cases 
where economic value is at stake, we ordinarily want a potential user to 
seek permission from the copyright owner and pay a price they negotiate. 
A copyist who fails to obtain consent and to pay is considered an infringer. 
ship is placed not where it is morally deserved, but instead where benefits 
and costs can best be internalized. Debate then would center on how the 
dynamics of human behavior would be affected by different starting points. 
For example, if authors and inventors are given initial ownership rights, 
what is likely to follow? Or if the public is given rights to copy, what is likely 
to follow? 
For economic purposes, ownership should be allocated according to whatever 
starting point is most likely to internalize benefits in a way that will give 
adequate incentives to produce socially-valuable products without causing 
excessive deadweight loss and administrative burdens. This involves essen-
tially empirical inquiry, but some armchair inferences can be drawn from 
general patterns of human behavior. Thus, I have argued elsewhere that 
intellectual property markets and consequent internalization evolve most 
easily when, inter alia, copiers have an incentive to identify themselves. If 
so, giving ownership to the author or inventor indeed makes more eco-
nomic sense than privileging all copiers. Conversely, I have argued that in 
most instances giving the public an entitlement to copy would be a cumber-
some starting point, causing immense problems of coordination from which 
to reach a socially desirable level of production. If so, a starting point that 
presumptively gives ownership to authors and inventors, rather than to the 
public, appears preferable. Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harm and Benefits: Torts, 
Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449 (1992). 
21 The instant article takes as its target model the classic Posnerian approach of 
"maximizing wealth as measured by willingness to pay." For an approach 
less used by lawyers but more similar to that used by academic economists, 
see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. 
REv. 961 (2001). As Kaplow and Shaven point out, Judge Posner has him-
self amended his stance. Id. at 996 n.68. 
22 This section is obviously indebted to the analysis in Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972). 
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Sometimes, however, the goals of the law cannot be achieved through 
the market. If so, market logic suggests this is a good occasion for a de-
fense: a doctrine or rule that permits the defendant to act without ob-
taining permission or paying compensation.23 The market perspective can 
be used not only to identify the occasion when a defense may be needed to 
achieve social goals, but can also help classify the possible defenses into 
excuses and justifications, as follows: 
A. Excuse 
Sometimes the law's goal is economic, but a market malfunction is 
present in the sense that the current conditions diverge strongly from 
those needed for perfect competition. For example, high transaction costs 
may make it impractical for plaintiff and defendant to deal with each 
other. In such a case, allowing the defendant to proceed with his copying 
may produce a higher level of value than enforcing the copyright by en-
joining the use. In such a case a court might allow a defendant fair use.24 
However, allowing free use in such cases is distinctly a second-best 
solution. Recall that a criminal court might excuse an insane defendant, 
but want him to have acted differently. Similarly, a copyright court in the 
presence of high transaction costs might excuse the defendant, but if the 
transaction-cost problem were eliminated, would want the defendant to 
proceed through the market. This notion of "we would prefer otherwise" 
is near the essence of excuse. 
23 A system of private law that puts the maximization of economic value above 
the maintenance of market "forms" will find either an excuse or a justifica-
tion - or a prima facie limitation on owners' rights - in all those situations 
where markets cannot be relied on to function as socially satisfactory insti-
tutions for the distribution of resources. This statement is a virtual tautol-
ogy. After all, a system that aims at value maximization by using markets 
will have to find some means to transfer resources other than through own-
ers' voluntary consent when that economic goal is unreachable through 
markets. 
Despite the tautology, the "market failure" language is useful: the economic 
paradigm provides a checklist and a structure for inquiry. It helps us iden-
tify many of the occasions on which the usual market-based system, where 
the owner's will is law, will not reliably maximize social value. Note, inci-
dentally, that the instant argument must alter if markets are desired for their 
own sake because, e.g., they contribute to an owner's autonomy. The instant 
analysis will assume that markets are desired because of their ability to con-
tribute to value-maximization. For an exploration of alternative norms, see 
Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Princi-
pled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REv. 579 (1985). See also, e.g., Netanel, supra 
note 7 (copyright should serve the norm of encouraging democratic civil 
society). 
24 See Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2. 
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B. Justification 
Sometimes, by contrast, going outside the market is a first-best solu-
tion. In particular, where non-economic values are at stake, we might feel 
very uneasy trusting. that market transactions could achieve the desired 
goals. In such a case, a judge might well decide that a defendant could be 
justified in proceeding without consent or compensation: that even if mar-
ket conditions were perfect, it would be normatively appropriate to pro-
ceed outside the market's ordinary process of consent and payment. 
For example, we might want a biographer to be able to quote from his 
subject's letters without obtaining the subject's consent. Similarly, we 
might want someone who is exposing the foibles of another's work to be 
able to quote from it without paying that other author compensation for 
the decrease in consumer demand that might follow. There can even be 
cases of copyright self-defense, where someone photocopies an attack that 
another wrote in order to refute it.25 Under many views of fairness, we 
would not want the photocopier to pay his attacker or be subject to the 
attacker's veto power. 
In such a case, because the inherent limitations of the market prevent 
it from implementing desired values, justification may appear. In these 
cases, the lack of permission or compensation may indeed be something 
we would want emulated. 
II. THREE TIERS OF INQUIRY 
I argue that potentially tortious acts contain at least three components 
that must be assessed in terms of both excuse and justification. These com-
ponents are (1) the defendant's ultimate behavior in the world, that is, the 
defendant's use of the affected party's resource, (2) the defendant not hav-
ing asked the affected party for her consent, and (3) the defendant not 
paying compensation to the affected party. Excuse and justification can go 
to any one level of inquiry, or all three. In order to make best use of the 
distinction between excuse and justification, we need to examine what is 
being excused or justified. 
Although it is not generally stated in precisely this fashion,26 all torts 
embody these three different levels of possible limitation. The tort of 
copyright infringement is no different. Consider the following examples, 
drawn both from common law and copyright, which illustrate the three 
25 Cf Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 
1986), discussed infra at notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 
26 The classic treatment is Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 22. They distinguish 
between rules that protect a right-holder's veto (a "property rule") and 
rules that give him only a right to be compensated (a "liability rule"). Id. at 
1092. They also discuss how the law might decide where to place an entitle-
ment in the first instance. Id. at 1096-106. 
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tiers of inquiry. Note that the answers to any of the three-tier inquiries can 
be expressed either in terms of defenses, or in terms of limitations on the 
plaintiff's initial right of action. 
A. Behavior 
Is the defendant's behavior desirable and/or excused? Learned 
Hand's negligence calculus reflects this kind of inquiry. If it is economi-
cally more efficient to neglect a precaution than to take it, negligence law 
imposes no liability on the defendant who fails to take the precaution. The 
privilege of self-defense also reflects this inquiry: it is desirable for persons 
to preserve themselves from attack. In copyright law, the desirability of 
the defendant's behavior - the use she makes of the plaintiff's copy-
righted work - also plays an obvious role.27 One illustration is the classic 
Time v. Geis case where an author was permitted fair use of copyrighted 
films showing the Kennedy assassination. The defendant had copied the 
films to illustrate a publicly valuable argument contesting the conclusions 
of the Warren Commission, and the court in granting fair use stressed the 
value of the defendant's behavior.28 
B. Lack of Permission 
If the defendant has not sought the property owner's permission, is 
that lack of deference to the plaintiff's property interest socially desirable 
and/or excused? Again negligence law and self-defense provide useful il-
lustrations. When an injury is unintentional, as in negligence law, no blame 
27 Fair use is an area that breaks or bends the usual copyright rules. For example, 
in the ordinary case, judicial diffidence is the rule, set down by Holmes: 
judges are supposedly ill equipped to evaluate art. Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). Some courts take this as an 
indicator they should not inquire into the social value of the works before 
them. In fair use, however, the social value of the defendant's use is often 
key. 
Similarly, in fair use cases the usual rule that "creativity is no defense" is 
turned on its head. In the ordinary case where the defendant has published 
a work that transforms plaintiff's work without plaintiff's permission, the 
defendant's creativity is no defense: his creativity merely makes his product 
an infringing "derivative work." Further, as Learned Hand said, "no plagia-
rist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not 
pirate." Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 
(1985) (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 
(2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936)). Yet creativity and the ex-
tent of transformation are often key in fair use cases. 
28 Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 145-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 
(finding "a public interest in having the fullest information available on the 
murder of President Kennedy"). As will appear below, however, virtually 
all uses of intangibles are justified. The harder questions are whether a lack 
of compensation and/or permission can be excused or justified. 
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attaches for failing to obtain advance permission from the injured party. 
That person's identity was not knowable in advance. In order to state a 
prima facie case in negligence, therefore, plaintiff must show something 
more than he suffered an unconsented injury.29 As for self-defense, if we 
focus on the person who initiated the attack, we think the attacker through 
his aggression against another has (within reason) forfeited his ordinary 
right to be consulted about what happens to his body. In copyright's fair 
use doctrine, too, a copyright owner can forfeit his normative right to be 
consulted. This was intimated by the Supreme Court in Acuff-Rose: since a 
copyright owner will not ordinarily license someone to lampoon him, a 
parodist may be justified in not seeking the owner's permission.30 
C. Lack of Compensation 
When the defendant has taken, used, invaded or injured something 
belonging to the property owner, is it justifiable or excusable that he not 
pay compensation for it? In the famous case of Vincent v. Lake Erie, a boat 
owner acted desirably in keeping his ship tied to the dock during a roaring 
storm, but the court nevertheless made him pay for damage done to the 
dock.31 The view of the law of Nuisance expressed in the Second Restate-
ment reflects a similar approach: a failure to pay can make otherwise rea-
sonable behavior "unreasonable."32 This contrasts with the more 
traditional tort approach, under which rightful behavior brought no need 
29 My "permission" category follows Calabresi & Melamed fairly closely. See 
their Property Rules, supra note 22, at 1106-09. 
30 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); see also infra at text 
accompanying notes 100-114 (endowment effect and pricelessness). 
31 Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). 
32 Se 
No permission 
No com...E_ensation 
Behavior 
Potentially 
Justified 
x 
No 
x 
Potentially 
Excused 
No 
Defendant loses 
x 
e RESTATEMENT 2o OF TORTS§ 826{bT(1979}(''An intentional invasion of 
another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if ... (b) 
the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of com-
pensating for this and similar harm to others would not make the continua-
tion of the conduct not feasible.") (The official comment on clause (b) is 
somewhat clearer: "It may sometimes be reasonable to operate an impor-
tant activity if payment is made for the harm it is causing, but unreasonable 
to continue it without paying.") 
Dividing the desirability of payment from the desirability of behavior and from 
the desirability of asking permission is most familiar from the "takings" area 
of Constitutional law. Under the Fifth Amendment, sometimes government 
must pay those whom it has adversely affected, even when the effect was a 
by-product of socially beneficial action and even when the government per-
missibly failed to obtain the affected citizen's permission. 
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to pay, and wrongful behavior could trigger both monetary and injunctive 
relief. 
As for copyright, its core tradition too unites injunctive and monetary 
relief. In the typical case where infringement is found, both remedies are 
available, and in the typical case where fair use is found, both remedies are 
denied. Nevertheless, for copyright also, the question of copyright owner's 
consent is sometimes separated from questions of compensation. This is 
seen most explicitly in the many compulsory licenses set up by copyright 
legislation. 33 
In the judicially formed doctrine of fair use, too, the Supreme Court 
has suggested that sometimes an injunction should be denied (suggesting 
that the permission of the copyright owner need not be sought), but pay-
ment should nevertheless be made.34 Thus, a use may be socially desirable, 
and it may be unnecessary to obtain the owner's consent, but payment 
may nevertheless be ordered. 
There are many applications of the notion that a defendant might appropri-
ately receive a gain that he may sometimes nevertheless be required to pay 
for. See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, II, J. 
LEGAL STUD. 421, 427 (1982). See also Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Infor-
mation: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 
149, 187 (1992) [hereinafter On Owning Information]. 
33 For example, the statute provides that any band can make a "cover" version of 
a song that has already been recorded simply by paying a statutory fee to 
the copyright owner. The composer who objects is powerless; he has no 
right to stop the making of a "cover" version that conforms to the provi-
sions of the statute. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2000). 
Incidentally, the compulsory license gives a privilege to make cover records, 
not to perform publicly. To perform a "cover," therefore, requires permis-
sion which, in practice, is sought by the venue and not the performers. It can 
be sought from the copyright owner, or (as occurs more often) a license can 
be obtained through BMI, ASCAP or other collective rights association 
that serves as the owner's representative. 
34 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 592 n.10. To represent this graphically, here is the situ-
ation for a parody that is found to be a "fair use" before Acuff-Rose: 
Potentially Potentially Defendant loses 
Justified Excused 
No permission x 
No compensation x 
Behavior x 
Compare this with how such a parody could be treated after Acuff-Rose if 
the hint in the footnote 10 is taken up by later courts: 
Potentially Potentially Defendant loses 
Justified Excused 
No _permission x 
No compensation x 
Behavior x 
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In such instances, one might say that the only wrong would be a de-
fendant's failure to compensate the plaintiff. Judge Keeton's term, "condi-
tional fault," is useful to refer to such cases. As he pointed out, sometimes 
"[i]t is the moral sense of the community that one should not engage in [a 
particular] type of conduct, because of risk or certainty of losses to others, 
without making reasonable provision for compensation of losses."35 My 
contention is that conditional fault, like other kinds of grounds for defen-
dant liability, can be justified or excused. 
Summary: For a market to serve as a socially acceptable mode of allo-
cating resources, ideally (a) the available institutions and technology must 
provide the conditions for perfect competition, such as perfect knowledge 
and an absence of transaction costs;36 and (b) society must want to dis-
tribute the resource in accord with efficiency criteria. Among academics, 
the dominant convention saves the term "market failure" for (a) the tech-
nical lack of perfect-market conditions. However, our pluralistic legal cul-
ture demands that we admit that markets can also fail when (b) the criteria 
that perfect markets maximize are simply not the criteria of most impor-
tance. Therefore it makes sense to use the term "market failure" broadly, 
whenever we have grounds to believe that bad results will follow from 
adhering to the rule of owner deference.37 
One can develop rules about the likely failure of rules,38 and as inti-
mated there are at least two categories of occasions when an owner guided 
by self-interest is not likely to act in a way that society can tolerate. The 
simplest and most familiar category might be called, as mentioned above, 
35 Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L REV. 
401, 427-28 (1959). Please note that nothing in Judge Keeton's analysis (or 
in the instant article) suggests that because some harmful actions are per-
missible when compensation is paid, all harmful actions are permissible 
when compensation is paid. To the contrary, much of the literature on com-
modification and commensurability seeks to identify the actions whose per-
missibility should not be conditioned on compensation and, further, to 
identify the actions that can be made wrongful by introducing monetary 
compensation where it does not belong. 
36 These are the assumptions that economists following Adam Smith have pos-
ited as necessary for the attainment of perfect competition and achieving 
consistency between public and private interest. Notable among these as-
sumptions are perfect knowledge, and the absence of transaction costs. See 
Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, for a brief summary. One of the 
best books examining the limits of the market model is Michael J. Trebil-
cock, The Limits of the Freedom of Contract (Harvard University Press 
1993). 
37 This broad use was employed in Fair Use as Market Failure; see note 2 supra. 
38 This can occur in ethics too; situations of duress provide one such category. For 
example, the usual rule that prohibits lying may be a bad rule for a bank 
teller to follow when answering a robber's questions about how to shut off a 
police-warning system. 
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market malfunction. This is when the facts of the real-world market at 
issue significantly fail to correspond with the factual assumptions behind 
the perfect market model.39 We are in the domain of market malfunction 
if we feel that if only the deviation from the set of perfect market assump-
tions could be "fixed," the market would be a satisfactory method of mak-
ing the needed decision. 
By contrast, the presence of nonmonetizable interests and other non-
monetary issues point up the inherent limitations of the market model. We 
can be in the domain of market limitation even if there is no technical 
problem to "fix" - if we would feel uncomfortable using the market to 
govern how the resource is used even if all the conditions of perfect com-
petition were present and satisfied. I define cases of "justification" as cases 
of market limitation. There the market simply is the wrong place to look 
for answers. 
Other kinds of excuse and justification may exist, as we will see when 
we come to assessing the tier I call "behavior." But from the perspective of 
the market, permission and compensation have particular roles: to help 
align private and public action. If the market cannot accomplish that task, 
either because of a lack of normative fit or a problem of technical market 
conditions, then a defendant might appropriately prevail despite a lack of 
permission and compensation. 
IV. MARKET LIMITATIONS AND THE VOCABULARY OF 
COMMODIFICATION 
A definitional note regarding the connection between "market limita-
tion" and "commodification" is in order. To say that economic norms are 
inapplicable to a given relation will often lead to the conclusion that the 
relation should not be commodified - which can involve denying a puta-
tive "owner" any right to sue in the given context.40 This link between 
market limitation and commodification should hardly be controversial. 
39 In instances of market malfunction, facts fail to correspond to perfect-market 
facts. The decision-maker will face an initial normative inquiry - namely, 
whether a market norm should govern - but if she finds the market norm 
applicable, she will focus most of her efforts on the subsequent question of 
what empirical facts are presented by the given situation. In the case of 
market limitation, by contrast, the decision-maker sees the perfect-market 
norm as itself inadequate. She will focus much of her effort on identifying 
and clarifying alternative norms and deciding which one(s) should govern 
the presented situation. 
40 There are many aspects to making something a commodity: the right to sell is 
one aspect that is often discussed, and another is the right to sue to exclude 
others. A decision against commodification can affect one or many such 
characteristics. 
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Yet it may strike some readers that "things" rather than "contextual rela-
tions" are the appropriate focus of the commodification debate. 
Admittedly, for reasons of academic path-dependence, debates over 
commodification often center on asking what "things" should or should 
not be commodified, as if resources could be permanently placed in one 
category (say, "property" or "commodity") or another (say, "personal" or 
"not tractable on a market"). However, as Margaret Jane Radin has 
pointed out, most resources are susceptible to varying categories,41 with 
the result depending largely on the relation between persons, or between 
persons and the resource. I share Radio's relational perspective.42 
When most of the relations regarding a thing are best handled outside 
the market, we are likely to place that "thing" in the category of things 
that cannot be owned. But that is only a presumptive categorization. It can 
be reversed. For example, consider the way that copyright protection ex-
tends to works of expression but does not extend to an author's ideas. 43 
Just as "fair use" allows an exception to the usual presumption that works 
of expressive authorship can be exclusively owned, the presence of certain 
relations can undo the usual presumption that ideas cannot be owned. 
It may be useful to explore this last example. In copyright, as I just 
suggested, people who create ideas have no property right to exclude 
others from using them, even if the ideas are embedded in a copyrightable 
work of expression. The reasons for so denying commodity status to ideas 
has both to do with economics (e.g., "ideas" are best exploited in diverse 
ways by non-centralized actors),44 and with non-economic notions of per-
sonality, autonomy and fairness (e.g., "ideas" become part of their recipi-
ents, and people who receive ideas should not be required to refrain from 
using parts of themselves45). But although ideas are usually non-commodi-
41 Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 18 (1987); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, in MARKETS AND 
JusTICE: NOMOS XXXI 165 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock 
eds., 1989). 
42 Persons adhering to a "thing" view of commodification might be said to have a 
"subject matter" perspective on the topic. Persons open to a "relational" 
view might be said to believe that "scope of rights" also matters for com-
modification. Since in most of intellectual property, subject matter and 
scope of rights always trade off against each other, cf, Robert A. Gorman, 
Copyright Protection for the Collection And Representation of Facts, 76 
HARV. L. REv. 1569, 1602 (1963), for intellectual property scholars a view 
of commodification that goes beyond "thingness" is practically inevitable. 
43 17 u.s.c. § 102(b) (2000). 
44 Compare Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J .L. 
& EcoN. 265 (1977) (patents are justifiable for those products whose ex-
ploitation is best managed by centralized decision-making). 
45 See Wendy Gordon & Sam Postbrief, On Commodifving Intangibles, 10 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 135 (review essay, 1998). 
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fied, in some circumstances they can be bought and sold: namely, in nego-
tiated two-party transactions between equals.46 Thus, a screenwriter can 
"sell" his client an idea, and the two can agree in an enforceable contract 
that the client will not share the idea with others.47 This is the law of 
"ideas" on which Hollywood operates.48 Such two-party transactions are 
the "relational" exception to the rule that ideas are not commodities.49 
Conversely, there can be relational exceptions to the presumption 
that certain things are usually commodities. In copyright, works of autho-
rial expression are usually commodified.5° Fair use is one of the doctrines 
that can negate this usual presumption that works of expression should be 
bought and sold. 
Thus, we have a trio of labels - market limitation, cases of possible 
justification, and non-commodified relations - that all make the same 
point: that there are many occasions on which a society cannot afford to 
rely on private ownership for its decision-making. 
A related definitional note regarding "commodification" may also be 
helpful. When an item is a commodity, it means (among other things) that 
an owner can divest herself of ownership, and that an owner can stop 
other people from using the thing. In both instances - the owner's power 
to sell or give away the thing, and the owner's right to sue other people 
who injure or use the thing - we are concerned with someone losing ac-
cess to the resource. To use Professor Radio's language of "human flour-
ishing": in the case of the power to sell or give, we are concerned lest 
someone divest herself of something that is crucial to her own human 
flourishing. In the case of limitations on rights to sue, we are concerned 
46 The enforceability of shrink-wrap contracts raises a quite different set of 
issues. 
47 Similarly, in patent law there can be no ownership in ideas that are obvious, 
and in copyright there can be no ownership in non-creative lists. Neverthe-
less, the courts will routinely enforce contracts regarding non-patentable 
ideas, and lists of names, so long as the contracts are genuinely negotiated 
between equal parties. Moreover, such contracts can be backed up by trade 
secret law. See Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 482-83 (1974). 
48 See, e.g., Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1497 (Cal. App. 
Dep't Super. Ct. 1990). Not officially published (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 
976, 977). 
49 In turn, blackmail law is the relational exception to the rule that allows negoti-
ated contracts over information to be enforced. In blackmail the purported 
contractual relation involves the infliction of unjustifiable harm and is so-
cially wasteful in a particularly obvious and dangerous way. See Wendy J. 
Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central Case, 
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741 (1993). 
50 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000): "Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with 
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression." 
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lest someone divest others of something that is crucial to their human 
flourishing. 
The policies can be much the same.51 Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that for "fair use," we are addressing only one part of the commodification 
conundrum: whether an owner should have a right to exclude others from 
the resource. Whether an owner should have a power to exclude herself 
from the resource - the issue of inalienability - is a separate question. 
V. EXAMPLES OF JUSTIFYING AND EXCUSING 
This distinction between justification and excuse now must be applied 
to the three-tier inquiry. As will appear, in copyright law the distinction 
has more "cutting edge" in regard to lack of compensation and permission 
than it does to behavior. 
A. Behavior 
In the analysis that follows, the term "behavior" is defined as the use 
that the defendant makes of the plaintiff's product. For example, in Time 
v. Geis the behavior was copying the Zapruder films in order to illustrate 
an argument about the Kennedy assassination. In The Wind Done Gone 
case, recently in the courts,52 the behavior is a young novelist's borrowing 
of characters and plot structures from Gone With the Wind in order to 
criticize and parody Margaret Mitchell's famous work of popular fiction. 
In Williams & Wilkins, the behavior was a federal library photocopying 
medical articles for the use of researchers. In the case of a software pirate 
who mass-produces and sells copies of copyrighted computer programs, 
the behavior is the production and distribution of these additional copies. 
Whether it is justifiable or excusable for a behavior to occur can be sepa-
rated from the question of whether it should have occurred only if the 
defendant had the copyright owner's permission (issue B, below), and 
from the question of whether the defendant should pay for the use (issue 
C, below). 
Thus, for example, it may be very desirable that copies of the software 
be made and distributed (issue A), but if this could and should proceed 
only through the copyright owner's voluntary licensing (issue B), then fair 
51 For example: for reasons of both economics and human flourishing, sometimes 
society is unwilling to allow someone to divest herself of liberty to use her 
own ideas. For similar reasons, society might be unwilling to give owners 
rights to prohibit others from using ideas. See Gordon & Postbrief, supra 
note 45. 
52 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (Sun-
trust I) and Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 
2001) (per curiam) (Suntrust II), reversing Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mif-
flin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001). The case was later settled. 
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use should be denied and the defendant enjoined. Alternatively, should it 
be decided that the copies should be made and distributed (issue A), and 
that the owner's voluntary licensing is unlikely to function appropriately 
(issue B), a court may yet decide that the defendant should pay compensa-
tion (issue C). 
For tangibles, the desirability of the defendant's behavior - isolated 
from questions of compensation - can be a matter of much dispute. This 
is true from the perspective either of market economics or of other norms. 
For tangibles, sometimes market failure can cause a lack of permission to 
be excused or justified, but the undesirability of the behavior itself can 
lead the court to find in favor of the plaintiff on the basis of an all-things-
considered decision.53 To put it another way, behavior is undesirable if we 
can say "even if the plaintiff was compensated, and even if the plaintiff 
gave permission, this behavior should not occur." With tangibles, there-
fore, much investigation is necessary to assess whether a behavior is value-
maximizing or otherwise desirable. 
For intangibles, by contrast, it is fairly hard to imagine a use that is not 
desirable so long as concerns regarding compensation are satisfied. Defen-
dant's use usually does not interfere with plaintiff's ability to use the intan-
gible. Because copyright like patent deals with inexhaustible public goods, 
we can light each other's candles without diminishing the light from our 
own.54 
Admittedly, some speech can be undesirable on the merits. Consider, 
for example, hate speech. This is not desirable behavior. Nevertheless, it is 
unlikely to trigger legal sanction because of the First Amendment. 
Interestingly, such treatment can be seen either through the lens of 
justification or excuse. Because of the First Amendment, judges are not 
likely to assess the merits of a defendant's message in deciding whether his 
copying is infringing or "fair." Rather, because of the free speech con-
cerns, the defendant's behavior is likely to be assessed at a higher level of 
53 Whether or not compensation is paid to the injured party, a value-maximizer 
does not want wasteful acts to occur. Similarly, under other norms there are 
behaviors that cannot be made acceptable by having the gaining party pay 
the injured party. 
54 "He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessen-
ing mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darken-
ing me." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2 (1966) (quoting 6 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180-81 (Washington ed. 1903)). 
Admittedly, one can imagine a contrary case: for example, if a software pirate 
creates 3,000,000 copies while the copyright owner has already created 
3,000,000 copies, there will be wasted production costs if only 4,000,000 peo-
ple desire a copy of the software at or above marginal cost. But although 
such a case can be imagined, copying that is undesirable in itself is empiri-
cally likely to be rare. 
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generality: say, his participating in public debate.55 Viewed with such gen-
erality, the behavior is justifiable. Alternatively, focusing on the defen-
dant's message itself, we might say that quoting from a copyrighted work 
as part of socially destructive speech is "excused" by the institutional con-
siderations mandated by the First Amendment. Hate speech is not some-
thing we want to be emulated, but it is something to which our legal 
sanctions are not well suited. 
Whether under the rubric of excuse, or of justification, then, for copy-
right most of the difficult issues arise not with behavior, but with permis-
sion and compensation. This is the reason why it is particularly important 
for understanding intellectual property to divide the defense inquiry into 
three parts. Too often we think of defenses in terms of the rightfulness or 
wrongfulness of behavior. For copyright, the behavior of copying is almost 
always rightful, or at least institutionally excused. The hard issues arise in 
relation to how the copying should be done: pursuant to voluntary licens-
ing under the market system, subject to an obligation to compensate the 
copyright owner, or freely. As to those issues, it can be helpful to identify 
if the market is functioning and whether market norms are applicable. 
B. Lack of Permission 
Assuming the goal of copyright is to achieve maximum social benefit, 
there is no reason to require a potential user of a work to ask the copy-
right owner's permission unless there is some way to believe the owner's 
self-interest is aligned with society's. When this is not the case - when, for 
example, social and private costs markedly diverge, or the interests in-
volved are not monetizable - seeking permission should not be required. 
As for justification, the commodification literature provides abundant 
examples of resources that justifiably should not be owned in the sense 
that they should not be subject to sale. Where the public interest cannot be 
ss It is our institutional commitment to the First Amendment that allows such 
speech to be disseminated, rather than the merits of what is said. Sometimes 
the law responds to harmful speech. For example, when someone quotes a 
target out of context in order to lie about him, the law of libel may respond, 
depending, inter alia, on whether the target was a public figure and whether 
the plaintiff spoke with reckless disregard of the truth. 
Note that elsewhere in this essay I recommend that judges allow themselves at 
least to admit when harm is caused by a work of authorship, and to allow 
speech in responses that mitigates harm. See the discussion infra accompa-
nying footnotes 68-74 and accompanying text. One might debate whether 
that recommendation, and the case law on which it is based, is inconsistent 
with the supposed neutrality of the "marketplace of ideas" notion, and how 
the recommendation fits with alternative conceptions of the First 
Amendment. 
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evaluated in monetary terms, it makes no sense to treat owner self-interest 
as if it were likely to generate socially desirable outcomes. 
When by contrast there is a technical failure of market functioning 
(typically, the presence of significant transaction costs), I would say the 
defendant who has not obtained permission is potentially "excused." He 
may be acting rightfully in not obtaining permission - or wrongly - but 
it is an empirical economist who can tell us if requiring permission would 
maximize value. 
There are also cases on the borderline between excuse and justifica-
tion. For example, sometimes we cannot trust the owner's judgment be-
cause there simply is no stable answer to "where is the highest valued use 
in monetary terms." Cases of unstable value could, on the one hand, be 
classified with cases of justification, since in the end a non-monetary met-
ric will be needed. On the other hand, perhaps these should be classified 
as cases of excuse, since many such cases can still be fruitfully addressed 
through a quasi-economic consequentialist calculation. This issue will be 
discussed below, under the heading of "pricelessness." 
C. Lack of Compensation 
In the domain of market malfunction and "excuse," the desirability of 
compensation is by definition measured by economic effect. Here we can 
usefully borrow from Frank Michelman's classic treatment of the analo-
gous question of whether governmentally inflicted injuries should be com-
pensated. 56 He suggests there are at least two primary reasons why a 
value-maximizing economist might favor requiring the government to pay 
compensation for acts that, while facially desirable from a societal point of 
view, inflict injury on private parties. 
First, paying compensation keeps the harm-causer honest. If the de-
fendant (the government) has to pay, it will not use the plaintiff's resource 
without being sure that the behavior contemplated will in fact generate 
enough benefit to outweigh the costs. 
Second, paying compensation averts the "demoralization costs" that 
can occur if the citizenry feels itself vulnerable to losing its investments at 
the whim of others. Professor Michelman suggests that the citizenry might 
work less hard in general if people thought their efforts might come to 
naught because of uncompensated governmental injury. 
For copyright, we do not have to worry much about the first consider-
ation. Given the inexhaustibility of intangible public goods, it will usually 
happen that copying and other uses of copyrighted works will in fact gen-
erate more benefits than costs. But the second consideration, what Profes-
56 Frank L. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967). 
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sor Michelman called "demoralization costs," has great importance in the 
copyright area - though in copyright, demoralization costs go by their 
more familiar name, "incentive effects." 
In cases of excuse, where wealth maximization provides the appropri-
ate norm, the incentive effects are likely to be crucial to the analysis. The 
legislature has presumptively decided what desirable incentive effects 
should be. If a grant of fair use substantially impairs those incentives, then 
a court might logically refuse to grant fair use treatment, or premise fair 
use on an obligation to compensate. 
What of justification? If something we value is degraded by being 
priced, a judge may think it inadvisable to order compensation. Yet, order-
ing compensation may not be the same as selling.57 Therefore, even in 
these cases, compensation might be a good idea if we made sure that any 
orders to pay were limited to cases where a defendant reaped enough mon-
etary benefit to pay and still find it profitable to make the use.58 Then plain-
tiff would be paid, and the defendant would be able to speak, and the 
realm of public discourse would still profit from defendant's work. How-
ever, as I suggest in the final section of this essay,59 there can be significant 
problems even with such limited orders to compensate. 
The chart on the next page may be a helpful summary of the 
discussion. 
57 See the discussion in MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED CoMMODITIES 
184-205 (1996). 
58 If a defendant merely has to disgorge a monetary benefit, he or she is unlikely 
to be harmed. As scholars of restitution law have observed, one cannot al-
ways sell what one has received (services and goods may have been con-
sumed; the markets may be distant; etc.) and no one can afford to pay for 
everything he or she might desire. Giving someone a service or a good and 
then requiring payment for it may make that person worse off than he or 
she would have been without the service or the product. Should a court 
require the defendant to pay for something non-monetary that he or she has 
gained, the defendant could indeed be harmed. Restitution law has long 
taken these considerations into account in an attempt to protect defendants 
from being made worse off after a restitution suit than they would have 
been had they never received a benefit from the plaintiff. See Gordon, On 
Owning Information, supra note 32 at text accompanying note 226 and fol-
lowing. The suggestion to utilize this approach for fair use purposes was 
made by Megan Richardson. 
59 See Sections XI "Caveat" and Conclusion infra. 
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Summary of Analysis 
Potential justification: Potential excuse - Neither excuse nor 
"inherent limitation" "malfunction" in justification applies: 
on market use market Defendant loses 
No The market norm is not The market norm and Either the market 
permission what should govern monetary criterion are norm and monetary 
OR money is not a appropriately applied measures are 
good measure of but the market is not appropriate and the 
welfare in this context. working.60 market is working, OR 
some other 
consideration61 leads a 
court to favor honoring 
the owner's property 
right. 
No Even if payment could Market breakdown Either the market 
compensation be practicably made, it makes it difficult for norm is appropriate 
would be normatively defendant to pay.62 and the market is 
wrong to make the functioning, or for 
defendant pay. some other reason 
(e.g., fairness) 
compensation is a good 
idea 
Behavior The defendant's Undesirable behavior Some behavior should 
behavior is desirable.63 might be excused for be stopped65 regardless 
Still need to assess if reasons other than its of whether the harmed 
permission or merits.64 person consents or 
compensation is receives 
required. compensation.66 
60 Example: the defendant may be excused for not obtaining the plaintiffs 
permission if there is such a short period of time between the defendant 
realizing she will need to use the plaintiffs copyrighted work and the time 
when the use must be implemented, that she is unable to send a permission 
request capable of being acted on in a timely fashion. 
61 One example of such other consideration is autonomy. Another is Neil 
Netanel's "robust civil sphere." Netanel, supra note 7. Another might be 
Milton Friedman's notion that private property promotes political freedom. 
62 An example might be when the cost of contacting the owner is larger than the 
value of the use. As another example, consider a critic who generates 
significant positive externalities when he quotes from the copyrighted work. 
63 If defendant's behavior is desirable, one still needs to look at issues of 
compensation and permission to know whether plaintiff or defendant 
should prevail. Note: In copyright, this paper suggests, a defendant's 
behavior is likely to be desirable. 
64 As a possible example of speech that may be undesirable but excused by First 
Amendment and institutional considerations, consider a neo-Nazi who 
quotes from others' copyrighted works as part of a campaign of hate. 
65 The "undesirable behavior" could be stopped either by letting plaintiff win a 
civil suit against defendant, or by the government bringing a criminal or 
regulatory action, or by private self-help. The defendant's act might be 
cabined in many different ways. 
66 This is linked to issues of inalienability. 
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VI. THE JUSTIFICATION OF SELF-DEFENSE AND ITS 
POTENTIAL ROLE REGARDING PARODY 
One of the most interesting questions in "fair use" has to do with 
whether copyright owners should be empowered to enjoin persons who 
copy from their work in order to criticize, parody, or otherwise lampoon 
them. From a "justification" perspective, the answer seems clear: no such 
injunction should be allowed. A paradigm instance of when we do not 
want a speaker to obtain a copyright owner's permission is when the 
speaker's use will be critical of the copyrighted work. If truth is a merit 
good that should be available without regard to payment, then a judge 
should not even order compensation.67 
Further, many critical and parodic uses are essentially acts of self-
defense, where someone who has been affected by an iconic work seeks to 
undo its negative effect on him or her.68 This is the case with Alice Ran-
dall, author of The Wind Done Gone. Randall's novel seeks to undermine 
and parody Margaret Mitchell's Gone With the Wind through use of 
Mitchell's own characters. Randall in a recent interview made clear that 
Gone With the Wind had injured her, and many other African-Americans. 
Randall said she would rather have been "born blind" if blindness would 
have enabled her to avoid reading Mitchell's novel,69 so great was the 
emotional harm she felt. 
As a privilege allows one to respond to a threat of physical harm in 
the law of battery, self-help is also potentially justifiable in the law of 
copyright. This has been recognized in fair use case law under the label of 
"rebuttal." As the Ninth Circuit observed in a case where Jerry Falwell as 
part of a fund-raising effort sent his supporters photocopies of a Hustler 
magazine attack on him: 
[A]n individual in rebutting a copyrighted work containing de-
rogatory information about himself may copy such parts of the 
work as are necessary to permit understandable comment. 
Falwell did not use more than was reasonably necessary to make 
67 See the discussion of Posner, infra at note 125. 
68 I do not propose that one harm "justifies" the victim committing a responsive 
harm. I am not talking about revenge. Rather, I am talking about reducing 
the harmful effects caused by the copyright owner's work. 
In the emotional realm, we acknowledge that merely speaking a trauma can 
help undo its effect. (See, e.g., the work of psychologist Alice Miller, For 
Your Own Good (1984)). This is true in the cultural realm as well. Giving 
voice can be curative. 
69 See The Connection Web site for July 16, 2001 with guest Alice Randall talking 
about her book, The Wind Done Gone (Houghton Mifflin Company 2001), 
which criticizes Gone With the Wind by means of writing a new novel that 
uses some of Mitchell's characters: available at http://archives.theconnec-
tion.org/archive/2001/07/0716b.shtml. 
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an understandable comment when he copied the entire parody 
from the magazine .... [T]he public interest in allowing an indi-
vidual to defend himself against such derogatory personal at-
tacks serves to rebut the presumption of unfairness.70 
Thus, although the First Amendment barred Falwell from suing Hustler for 
the emotional damage the attack caused him,71 the First Amendment did 
not bar the court from giving Falwell a "self-help privilege" of self-defense 
assertable under the label of fair use.72 
That the judge's self-defense argument puts us in the realm of inher-
ent market limitation rather than market malfunction is patent. Nothing in 
the judge's discussion of the dispute between Hustler and Falwell's Moral 
Majority attempts to balance the harms and benefits. 
To embrace self-defense within fairness does not mean the justifica-
tion inquiry requires a judge to wander without guidance. Several articul-
able normative structures can give content to a notion of "fairness" that is 
sensitive to self-defense. One such structure is Lockean natural rights. 
Locke suggested that property rights could arise from labor providing 
that the laborer left "enough, and as good" in the common for others.73 
Building on that Lockean proviso, I have argued that works of authorship 
that do harm (such as the Hustler attack and the racist portions of Gone 
With the Wind) should not have the aid of the law in doing so. That is, a 
copyright owner whose work has harmed someone has no natural right to 
prevent the harmed party from quoting or copying the injurious work in 
an attempt to undo its effects.74 Such quotation or copying is justified. 
It might be argued that behavior cannot be "justified" by reference to 
harms caused by speech, since the First Amendment requires all of us to 
bear most speech harms without legal recourse. But the case law seems to 
draw a dividing line between rights to sue (which the First Amendment 
10 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 
1986). 
71 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). (When Hustler made fun 
of Falwell in a lampoon that was both disgusting and untrue, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the First Amendment barred his suit for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.) 
72 It might be argued that a personal attack (as by Hustler against Falwell) gener-
ates a self-defense privilege that is not available when a group is attacked. 
By contrast, I think the two cases sufficiently analogous - and the problem 
of cultural marginalization of minority groups sufficiently serious - that 
the Falwell case could be treated as suitable precedent for the privilege of 
group self-defense. 
73 JoHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GovERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d 
ed. 1967) (3d ed. 1698) (corrected by Locke) (bk. II, § 27). 
74 Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individu-
alism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533-609 
(1993) [hereinafter A Property Right in Self-Expression]. 
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can bar), and rights to self-help: While the First Amendment precluded 
Falwell from bringing suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress to 
recompense the injury he felt Hustler had caused him, the court under 
"fair use" gave Falwell a privilege to use self-help, and to quote or copy 
the injurious work in an attempt to undo its effect.75 Lockean natural 
rights would come to the same result.76 
VII. PRICELESSNESS AND PRWATE CENSORSHIP 
The above discussion suggests that some critics and parodists can use 
self-defense as an argument for fair use. Such an argument lies in the 
realm of justification. What I want to explore now is the possibility that 
even economic norms can lead to a substantial privilege for critics. That is, 
I aim to prove that for critical speech, a speaker who has not sought the 
owner's consent or who proceeds against an owner's consent has a poten-
tial excuse as well as a justification.77 In instances of private censorship, 
free speech is not the only value that dictates a defendant victory. Eco-
nomics, too, can lead to the same result. It will be useful to examine this 
example in some detail, borrowing both from the economics literature and 
the literature on commodification.78 
In the most recent "fair use" case before the Supreme Court, the 
opinion indicated that fair use could be justified in part as a response to 
situations in which copyright owners are unlikely to give permission at vir-
tually any price.79 Other cases have taken the same position.so This posi-
tion, advanced in a case involving a song parody, might strike the reader as 
75 Although unable to sue Hustler for damages, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46 (1988), Falwell was held entitled under the fair use doctrine to 
photocopy the Hustler lampoon for purposes of raising money to defend 
himself. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 
(9th Cir. 1986). 
76 Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression, supra note 74. 
77 See also the discussion of Richard Posner's position, infra notes 81 and 125. 
78 The material on pricelessness and endowment effect borrows from my prior 
work, particularly Wendy J. Gordon, On the Economics of Copyright, Resti-
tution, and "Fair Use": Systemic Versus Case-By-Case Responses to Market 
Failure, 8 J.L. & INFO. SCI. 7 (1997) (Australia); Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a 
Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Pri-
vate Censorship, 57 U. Ctt1. L. REv. 1009 (1990) (review essay). 
79 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). In assessing the plain-
tiffs claim that the parody would impair their potential market, the Court 
responded: "[T]he unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will li-
cense critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such 
uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market." Id. at 592. 
so The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made a similar point in Fisher v. Dees, 794 
F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The parody defense to copyright infringement 
exists precisely to make possible a use that generally cannot be bought."). 
For other cases involving similar anti-dissemination motives on the part of 
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inconsistent with the usual economic assumption that one must take pref-
erences as a given. If one takes this notion seriously - it is sometimes 
known as the assumption of "consumer Sovereignty" - then it seems the 
Court should have accorded as much respect to the copyright owner's de-
sire not to be parodied as to any other value. After all, in theory, an un-
willingness to sell or license merely indicates that the potential buyer/ 
licensee is not the highest-valued user. So it may seem wrongheaded of the 
Supreme Court to suggest that it may be appropriate to give a parodist -
a disappointed licensee - the liberty to copy for free on the ground that 
the owner would not sell him a license. Is the Court under-valuing the 
owner's preferences? Not necessarily; there are several explanations of the 
Court's approach that are consistent with the traditional economic defer-
ence to individual preferences. 81 
When a copyright owner refuses to let someone adapt her work for 
purposes of parodying it, or refuses to give an ideological opponent per-
mission to quote lengthy passages, or insists on suing anyone who quotes 
passages of her memoirs that reflect unfavorably on her, she is using her 
copyright as a tool of suppression.82 The question of whether authors 
should be entitled to refuse permission to those users of whom they disap-
prove is a complex one. For example, there can be practical problems in 
distinguishing improperly motivated suppression from a refusal to license 
motivated by a desire to maximize financial return.83 More important than 
copyright proprietors, see Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, 
and Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits, supra note 78, at 1632-33. 
81 Judge Posner admits, "it may be in the private interest of the copyright owner, 
but not in the social interest, to suppress criticism of the work." Richard A. 
Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 73 (1992). He also 
treats "reluctan[ce] to license" as a factor that should favor fair use. Id. at 
71. However, he is not clear as to what methodology he uses to reach that 
conclusion. His stated reason for his conclusion - that we should en-
courage the production of truth, id. at 75 - suggests that he is using a mix-
ture of economic and noneconomic norms. See note 125 infra. 
82 Similar instances also appear in the corporate realm. For example, when a 
newspaper expanded its TV coverage it told its readership about the ex-
tended service in an advertisement that pictured a copyrighted TV Guide 
cover for purposes of comparison. TV Guide then sued for copyright in-
fringement. Presumably the suit was motivated by something other than a 
desire for license fees. The comparative advertising was held to be a fair 
use. See Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 
1171 (5th Cir. 1980). 
83 For example, it can be difficult to distinguish suppression from an attempt to 
direct the work into the most valuable derivative work markets. See, e.g., 1 
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT 571-73 (1989) (rights over derivative works 
can affect the direction of investment and the type of works produced). 
Similarly, in regard to unpublished works, it can be difficult to distinguish 
cases of suppression from cases of economically motivated refusals to Ii-
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the practical problems may be a conceptual one. If the proper way to look 
at these problems were economic, then, as mentioned, the principles of 
consumer sovereignty would seem to dictate that governmental decision-
makers should not question why someone refuses to sell or license.84 Eco-
nomics "assum[es] that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life,"85 
and a desire to suppress would seem to be as rational an end as a desire for 
fame or fast cars. 
Additionally, Ronald Coase has persuasively emphasized the impor-
tance of transaction costs by showing that, in their absence, the ultimate 
allocation of a resource will be efficient regardless of how entitlements are 
initially assigned.86 So long as the parties can meet face to face, as a copy-
right owner and potential parodist or critic could often do, why should 
there be any need for the judiciary to do anything but enforce whatever 
property right is before it? 
Whether suppression would or would not be economically desirable 
will depend in most cases on empirical analysis of the particular fact pat-
tern. 87 But some general observations can indicate preliminarily why, 
cense. An author accused of suppression may be simply trying to keep the 
work out of the public eye temporarily until it reaches its mature form and 
can be published. 
Even if some practical means existed to distinguish all dissembling "suppres-
sors" from those copyright owners who are genuinely motivated by finan-
cial return, some cases will present instances of truly mixed motives. For 
example, the owner of copyright in an out-of-print collection of letters 
might sue a biographer who extensively quotes the letters, not only out of a 
dislike for the biographer's message or perceived inaccuracies, but also out 
of a desire to preserve the reprint market for the letters. See Meeropol v. 
Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 520 
F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). 
84 The discussion that follows draws in part on Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence 
of Benefits, supra note 78, at 1042-43. 
85 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (5th ed. 1998). 
86 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). 
Efficiency will occur in the absence of factors such as transaction costs, 
wealth or endowment effects, and strategic behavior. See id. (transaction 
costs). See also, e.g., Donald Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 
15 J. LAW & EcoN. 427 (1972) (strategic behavior). Compare Ronald H. 
Coase, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET 
AND THE LAW 157 (1988). 
87 Even if one interprets copyright's -economic goal as being solely the use of 
incentives to "promote knowledge," so that satisfying the copyright owner's 
personal tastes would not count as an independent value, the empirical an-
swer to suppression questions would not be easy: in a given case enforcing 
any particular type of suppression would both keep some knowledge secret, 
and yield long-term incentives that could aid knowledge in the long run 
(because authors who can suppress have a copyright worth more than au-
thors who cannot). Cf Michelman, Property, Utility & Fairness, supra note 
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when copyright owners seek to use the copyright law to enforce attempts 
at suppression, neither consumer sovereignty nor the Coase Theorem sug-
gest that judges give the owners automatic deference.BB 
At least four reasons suggest that the market cannot always be relied 
upon to mediate attempts at suppression and that it might be economically 
desirable to refuse authors an entitlement to suppress.89 The four reasons 
are: the "suppression triangle"; pecuniary effects; managerial discretion; 
and what I call "pricelessness." In addition, of course, it is possible that 
economics is not the right way to view this matter at all. The four reasons 
are interrelated, and to explicate them let me begin with the "suppression 
triangle." 
A. Suppression Triangle 
I use the term "Suppression Triangle"90 to point to the fact that in 
cases involving the suppression of information or other intellectual prod-
ucts,91 at least three parties are affected: (1) the person who seeks or 
threatens to make the contested use (for example, the potential parodist), 
(2) the copyright owner who wants to keep the material from being copied 
or adapted (the potential suppressor), and (3) the person or persons who 
would want to see the material (the potential recipients). This is the trian-
gle of affected interests. Yet in the suppression transaction typically only 
two parties are present: the potential user (such as a parodist); and the 
copyright owner. Whether an attempt to suppress is likely to be value-
maximizing will depend, inter alia, on how well the interest of the omitted 
third party, the class of potential recipients, is represented by the two im-
mediate participants. 
56 (the effects of demoralization on productivity). Which of the two poten-
tial effects on knowledge would be greater (the loss from enforcing suppres-
sion or the gain from long-term incentives) cannot be determined a priori. 
BB For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Wendy J. Gordon, The Right Not to 
Use (unpublished manuscript). 
B9 Additional reasons might include, e.g., the potential nonmonetizability of First 
Amendment values. See Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1631-32. 
90 I base this theory in part on the work of James Lindgren in the blackmail area. 
See James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 670 (1984) (discussing the three-party structure involved). For an eco-
nomic analysis of blackmail stressing other aspects of blackmail activity, see 
Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REv. 
655, 673-74 (1988). 
I am indebted to Warren Schwartz for suggesting the potential relevance of the 
blackmail literature to this problem. 
91 Data can implicate different issues than can, e.g., literary expression. For pur-
poses of this very general discussion, however, I shall group all together 
under the rubric "information." 
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Theoretically, the more valuable the parody or other use is to the 
public, the more the public should be willing to pay for it, and the more 
the parodist should be willing and able to bid for permission. Thus, the 
notion of the Invisible Hand92 expects that any market participant will be 
in a position to reflect the interests of affected third parties (that is, the 
public audience). Nevertheless, the Invisible Hand often falters, and the 
possibility of misallocation remains. 
Consider a hypothetical novelist or moviemaker who wants to keep 
the world from knowing what a hostile critic or parodist has to say about 
his work. Assume also that the critic or parodist wants to quote from the 
work or use its imagery, and that use of the quotation or imagery is some-
how essential to the comprehensibility or believability of the criticism or 
parody.93 If the law required the critic or parodist to purchase licenses to 
quote or paraphrase, how sure could we be that the "highest-valued" use 
would ensue? 
For purposes of mathematical example, assume that the critic or paro-
dist stands to earn at most a $1,000 profit from even the best-written prod-
uct. Assume that the novelist or film-maker would lose $50,000 if the 
criticism or parody were published. Since the copyright owner would 
charge at least $50,000 for a license to criticize or ridicule his work, and the 
critic or parodist stands to gain only $1,000 from publishing, it may look 
like the copyright owner holds the "highest valued" use when compared 
with the parodist or critic. But that may be an illusion resulting from the 
fact that the third party (in the owner/user/public triangle) is not being 
counted as part of the deal. 
The publishing of the review or parody might benefit the public (who 
would thus be warned off from, say, a much-hyped romance novel that 
does not really excite anyone who reads past page five). Perhaps the pub-
lic gains something like that same $50,000, or perhaps even more. On 
these hypothesized facts, requiring the publisher to seek a license from 
someone who would not sell it is a bad idea, and giving the publisher (the 
critic or parodist) free use is a good idea. Both are consistent with eco-
92 Adam Smith argued that people pursuing their self-interest will come to re-
sults that are in accord with social need, as if guided by an "invisible hand." 
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (Modem 
Library 1937). 
93 There is another factor that may be at work here as well: the idea/expression 
dichotomy. Since under current law copyright owners cannot prevent others 
from using their ideas, it could be argued that little suppression of note 
could occur. For simplicity's sake, therefore, assume that in the following 
examples whatever the defendant has taken from the first artist's work 
could be considered copyrightable expression rather than simply "idea" and 
that the use of the copyrighted expression is somehow essential to the effec-
tiveness of the planned derivative work. 
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nomic measures of value. If the critic had been able to capture the full 
value that the review gave to the audience, then the novelist's $50,000 min-
imum asking price would have been met. 
A parodist may similarly be unable to capture the full value that the 
work holds for the audience. This can occur for many reasons.94 There 
may be significant positive externalities and surplus in the market for par-
odies, for example. There also may be other complications in the markets 
for reviews and parodies, such as pecuniary losses that diverge from socie-
tal economic losses. 
B. Pecuniary Losses 
Much of the loss that can come from a critical review will often be 
merely pecuniary, reflecting not a net loss to society but rather a shifting 
of revenues from one novelist to another and possibly better one.95 Say, 
for example, that after a negative review of the copyright owner's book, 
audiences turn to a better novelist's book. It begins to sell well and gener-
ates more than $50,000 in royalties that would not otherwise have been 
earned. It is as if the triangle now were a geometric figure with four points 
(the criticized novelist, the critic, the public, and the better novelist). If 
one could add to the $1,000 the reviewer could offer for a "license to criti-
cize" the $50,000 that the better novelist would reap, plus the amount that 
consumers gain from avoiding a bad book, the total value generated by the 
review would be enough to outweigh the initial copyright owner's pecuni-
ary loss. Since this hypothetical additur is highly unlikely to happen,96 
mere pecuniary losses may take on an importance they should not have 
and they might prevent socially desirable licensing. 
C. Managerial Discretion 
Another possible complication has to do not with the potential 
buyer's inability to raise the appropriate amount of capital, but with the 
potential licensor's potential inability to know even a good deal when it 
94 As economist Michael L. Katz writes of the similar problem in the research 
and development area: In the absence of perfect discrimination, the firm 
conducting the R & D will be unable to appropriate all of the surplus gener-
ated by the licensing of its R & D, and the firm will sell its R & D results at 
prices that lead to inefficiently low levels of utilization by other firms. 
Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development, 4 
RAND J. EcoN. 527, 527 (1986). 
95 See Richard A. Posner, Conventionalist Defenses of Law as an Autonomous 
Discipline 17 (Sept. 21, 1987) (unpublished manuscript using pecuniary ef-
fects to explain why landowners who create certain positive spillovers are 
not entitled to payment from those who benefited). 
96 Journalistic ethics would undoubtedly forbid reviewers of a given book to ac-
cept subsidies from the authors of competing books. 
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comes along. This complication can be termed managerial discretion,97 by 
which I mean to embrace all those agency problems that may make man-
agers in complex corporations sometimes arrive at decisions that are less 
value-maximizing than they could be. I would include here, for example, 
personal risk aversion, bureaucratic structure, group dynamics, and lazi-
ness.98 Thus, the officials of a company that owns a given copyright may 
refuse to license simply because the requested license is in an unfamiliar 
field and their particular bureaucratic structure penalizes unlucky risk tak-
ers more than it rewards lucky ones. When critical, parodic, or otherwise 
controversial licenses would be at issue, the human desire to "play it safe" 
might prevent value-maximizing transfers from occurring.99 Managerial 
discretion is just one of many agency problems that can prevent the parties 
from dealing with each other like the unitary participants in the classic 
Coasian transaction. 
D. Pricelessness 
All of the above are reasons why socially desirable "licenses to be 
critical" are not likely to be granted if left solely to the devices of copy-
right owners.100 One additional and probably most important factor re-
mains to be discussed: the difference between the minimum price a person 
would accept to sell something, and the maximum amount that same per-
son would pay if she wished to purchase the thing.101 
The concept here basically refers to the fact that giving someone an 
entitlement makes that person richer, and this may change how the holder 
monetarily values both the entitlement and other resources, and this in 
97 There is a fairly extensive literature on the controversial question of whether 
managerial discretion exists and if so what impact it has and what should be 
done about it. I draw on it here only to make the most general point: that 
agency problems will often prevent value-maximizing choices from 
occurring. 
98 In an individual, a taste for risk or laziness might be a legitimate part of her 
personal utility curve, but a manager is supposed to maximize the utility of 
the corporation. 
99 But see Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Endowment Effects 
Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002) (Ex-
perimental evidence suggests that corporate agents may be less likely than 
ordinary persons to exhibit differences between willingness to pay and will-
ingness to accept). 
100 Of course, such licenses might be granted; I offer here only an abstract analysis 
that would need to be empirically verified. · 
101 I follow Mishan here. He used the term "welfare effects" to examine the allo-
cative impact brought about by a change in wealth, including the change 
brought about by being given, or being denied, an entitlement. Mishan ar-
gued that one reason for this impact can be ability to pay. E.J. Mishan, The 
Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. EcoN. LIT. 1, 
18-19 (1971). 
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turn may affect how entitlements are eventually allocated once bargaining 
between that person and other persons is completed.102 Variations in buy 
and sell valuations do not retard resources from moving to hands where, 
given a particular entitlement starting-point, the resources have their high-
est monetary value. But the location of that highest value may depend 
crucially on starting point. Admittedly, these variations do not often make 
a difference; in instances where fungible commodities are sold in markets 
populated by many buyers and sellers, "buy" and "sell" valuations proba-
bly tend to converge. But, when the variations do have an impact, they 
have the potential of rendering the meaning of "highest-valued" use inde-
terminate in the sense that the location of the highest-valued use is not 
independent of the law. In such cases, everything can depend on the legal 
assignment of entitlements that form the transaction's starting point. 
For example, you are unlikely to sell a privilege to inflict significant 
pain on yourself, no matter how much money another person offers for 
the privilege. Assuming you begin with such a right, you would not sell it 
to a sadist or a foe. By refusing to sell, you appear to be the highest-valued 
"user" of your body, and its continuance in a harm-free state seems to be 
the highest-valued "use" for your body as a resource. But consider what 
would happen if the entitlement were switched. If the law gave the sadist 
or foe liberty to inflict pain on you, he might refuse your monetary offers 
in preference to pursuing his pleasures. At that point the sadist or foe 
would appear to be the highest-valued user - and the highest-valued use 
of your body would appear to be serving as a pin-cushion.103 The apparent 
location of "highest value" has switched. 
When things like pain and bodily integrity are at stake, therefore, the 
notion of highest-valued use is dependent on legal starting points. It would 
be circular to make the search for the highest-valued use the basis for 
assigning initial entitlements to such things. As Edwin Baker has pointed 
out, if we tried to assign a right in such things "to the party who would buy 
it from the other party if the party had the right," we could locate no such 
102 For an excellent numerical example, see id. at 18-21. It is well recognized that a 
divergence often exists between the price that a potential buyer would be 
willing to pay for a resource he does not own, and the price that the same 
person would demand before he would sell that same resource if the law 
had initially awarded its ownership to him. What is less clear is what termi-
nology, explanations, and characterizations are best employed for discuss-
ing the phenomenon. For a valuable discussion, see Elizabeth Hoffman & 
Matthew Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and 
Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993). 
103 See Mishan, supra note 101, at 18-19; Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Bene-
fits, supra note 78, at 1042-43; see also Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural 
Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHJo ST. L.J. 491, 518-19 
(1990) ("flip-flop" of rights). 
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party. The answer is indeterminate: "neither party would buy because 
neither party would sell. " 104 
Professor Coase showed that in a world without transaction costs, 
welfare effects or strategic behavior, resources will be traded to their high-
est-valued uses, so that, as between any two users of a resource, if A can 
use the resource more productively than B, A will end up with it. 105 
Therefore, many scholars argue, in a real world full of transaction costs 
that can impede bargaining, it often makes sense to "mimic the market"106 
and assign legal rights to the highest-valued user in the first instance. This 
is a core insight of law and economics. Yet the law and economics argu-
ment largely depends on there being a stable highest-valued user. The in-
junction to "seek efficiency by mimicking the perfect market" only makes 
normative sense if the perfect market allocation is stable. If the allocation 
of rights significantly affects the monetary valuation that parties place on a 
resource, then there may be no stable economic reality for the law to seek 
to mimic. 
There is at least one salient class of goods that lack this stability. 
These are the precious, personal, irreplaceable, crucial goods one thinks of 
as "priceless." Examples are many: the Dead Sea Scrolls; family heir-
looms; one's children, health, reputation and peace of mind. The monetary 
value a person places on one of these goods may well depend on whether 
the person has a legal entitlement to it (whether she "owns" it) or whether 
she must purchase it. 
Some of the change in monetary valuation may stem from differing 
psychological attitudes people have to things that are "theirs" versus 
things they have to purchase. Even with items as trivial as coffee mugs this 
endowment effect can be seen. (In experiments, college students were 
found to value mugs differently depending on whether the student's status 
was as an "owner" of the mug or as a "possible purchaser"107) But for 
many goods, like the coffee mugs, the effect is likely to be minor enough 
not to affect the identification of highest-valued use.108 
104 C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL & 
Pusuc AFF. 3, 12 (1975). This is perhaps the first legal article to discuss the 
relevance of such effects for the law. 
105 See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 86. 
106 Assigning the legal right to the person who would purchase it saves society the 
costs of transfer, and ensures that the resource finds its way to the highest-
valued user. However, there are many reasons to decline to mimic the mar-
ket in this way. For example, a low-valuing user may nevertheless be mor-
ally entitled to payment for the resource, or incentive concerns may dictate 
giving the low-value user compensation for a resource he may hold. 
107 For further exploration, and for citation to relevant literature, see J.J. Rachlin-
sky & F. Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 V AND. L. 
REv. 1541 (1998); Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 102. 
108 See Coase, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, supra note 86, at 157, 170-74. 
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The case is far different for things we think of as priceless. For them, 
adding to whatever endowment effect may exist, is the simple but im-
mensely powerful constraint of a person's purchasing power, his or her 
ability to pay. For things of great value, ability to pay can interact with 
ownership status to yield obvious shifts in what appears to be the highest 
valued use.109 
Consider health, for example. It is plausible that most people would 
be unwilling to sell their organs at any price, so that Jane Smith might turn 
down an offer of $5,000,000 from Billionaire X for one of her kidneys. 
Similarly, if Jane Smith has kidney failure and one of her dying relatives 
wills her a healthy kidney, she might well be unwilling to take the billion-
aire's $5,000,000 in exchange for her entitlement to it. If so, Jane Smith 
looks like the kidney's "highest-valued user." But should she have no enti-
tlement to the kidney from the recently-deceased person (perhaps because 
the relevant jurisdiction does not recognize such bequests as enforceable), 
Jane Smith's own budget and health insurance will place a limit on how 
much she can spend pursuing the transplant. It is highly unlikely she will 
be able to outbid Billionaire X for the kidney. If so, Billionaire X will 
appear to be the "highest-valued user." One can draw from such a pattern 
no reliable information about whether the resource has its highest value in 
the hands of the billionaire or Jane Smith. This phenomenon might be 
called the "pricelessness effect." 
The pricelessness effect is related to the phenomenon already men-
tioned: since assigning an entitlement to someone makes that person 
wealthier, it can affect the valuation the person puts on resources. For ex-
ample, often "accept" and "offer" prices differ from each other. Many 
people hedge the Coase Theorem by noting it does not apply when signifi-
cant effects of this kind are present. But usually such effects are so minor 
that they do not impair the reliability of using a market mimicry approach 
to model efficiency.110 
109 "[W]herever the welfare involved is substantial," Mishan points out, ability to 
pay may account for potent shifts in perceived value, "The maximum sum 
he will pay for something valuable is obviously related to, indeed limited by, 
a person's total resources, while the minimum sum he will accept for parting 
with it is subject to no such constraint." See, e.g., Mishan, supra note 101, at 
18-19. 
110 See Coase, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, supra note 85, at 170-74 (dis-
cussing arguments re the presumed effect of changes in legal position on the 
distribution of wealth and on the allocation of resources). 
Professor Coase argues that the impact of these effects can be overstated be-
cause, among other things, if the legal rules are known in advance, the 
prices of applicable resources will likely alter in a way that minimizes such 
effects; in addition, he suggests, contractual provision for contingencies may 
be available to mitigate some changes in legal rules. See id. at 157. See also 
id. at 170-74. Neither of these devices is likely to eliminate the effect - here 
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The "pricelessness effect" deserves having its own name precisely be-
cause the subcategory of effects it denotes is likely to be significant. The 
"pricelessness effect" comes into play when the entitlement at issue per-
tains to a good that (1) an individual or group values very highly, and (2) 
which is virtually irreplaceable, and (3) when it is the allocation of that 
very good111 which is at issue. As to such items, the initial placement of 
the entitlement is likely to have a sharp effect on the price and allocation 
of the resource, even in the absence of transaction costs. 
In cases of parody or criticism, both areas where "fair use" treatment 
tends to be awarded to defendants, reputation may be at issue. To many, 
reputation is priceless in the sense we have been discussing. For example, a 
novelist who fears that a journalist will use extensive quotations from her 
book to bolster a hostile review will be most unlikely to sell the journalist 
a license to copy those quotations - regardless of the price offered. But 
that does not mean the author's preference is the "highest-valued use" in 
any meaningful sense, since that same author may be unable to buy silence 
if the law gives the journalist a "fair use" liberty right to publish. A similar 
analysis can be made of parody: since most people intensely dislike being 
ridiculed, the legal right may determine where the highest-valued use 
lies.112 In such cases, the market is useless as a guide, and formal defer-
ence to owners' market powers is inappropriate. 
For example, assume A is a novelist, a copyright owner who has an 
entitlement not to license and who is otherwise financially comfortable; 
she has perhaps $4,000 in the bank, a two-year old car and a prospect of 
steady royalties. She may be tempted by B's offer of, say, $10,000 for a 
license to use her work, but she can afford to say no without altering her 
lifestyle. If B's project is an ordinary commercial project and A will not be 
sacrificing more than $10,000 from foregoing alternative uses of the work, 
she will probably license. (It might also happen that B's project would not 
require an exclusive license and would not otherwise interfere with A's 
other licensing opportunities. If so, granting B permission to go forward 
would have no opportunity cost at all for A. She would be even more 
likely to license such a use.) However, if B's project is hostile toward A's 
work as a whole, A may well refuse the license, either to protect her long-
called "pricelessness" - in the context of authorial suppression of embar-
rassing criticism, however. 
111 That is, while I predict that the law's assignment of rights in organs or free 
speech is likely to have a distinct effect on the allocation of kidneys or 
speech, it is a more complex question whether the Jaw's assignment of rights 
in organs will have much of an effect on the allocation of other resources. 
112 These points are also explored in Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits, 
supra note 78, at 1042-43; see also Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, 
at 1632-36 (anti-dissemination motives). 
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term economic interest (which may be a mere pecuniary loss, remember), 
her aesthetic reputation, or her feelings. 
If however the law gave novelist A no entitlement to prevent B's use, 
then she would have to persuade B not to publish (cf "paying for silence," 
as in blackmail). The most A could offer B to persuade B not to make the 
critical use planned is the amount in her bank account, plus whatever she 
could sell her car for, plus whatever she could borrow on the strength of 
her expected royalty stream. The total may well be less than $10,000, and 
B will probably demand a price in excess of $10,000. Give A the entitle-
ment and the highest-valued use of the contested expression is in her 
hands; give B the entitlement and the highest-valued use is in that licen-
see's hands. The locus of the "highest-valued use" has shifted as a result of 
where the law places its entitlement. In such cases, looking to the results of 
consensual transactions will not give us any information about who 
"should" have the right. 
Another way to put the point is this:113 Economics is sometimes used 
as a normative guide for good social policy. When it is used in this fashion, 
its primary claim to legitimacy stems from the links between economics 
and utilitarianism114 The more that income distribution restricts the ex-
pression of individuals' preferences, the shakier the link between econom-
ics and utility becomes. This linkage has the potential for completely 
breaking down in cases of "pricelessness." Though in such cases the par-
ties' preferences may remain constant, both in their objects and in their 
intensity, a shift in who owns the entitlement may effectively disable one 
of those parties from effectuating that preference. Thus, a legal regime 
that is committed (even in part) to utilitarian consequentialism would be 
unwise to rely upon a money-bound market model for normative guidance 
in cases of pricelessness. 
In sum, refusing to allow a copyright owner to suppress a hostile use 
of the copyrighted work, in a case where the "pricelessness effect" is likely 
to make a determinative difference, does not necessarily contravene eco-
nomic principles. In such an instance, it is appropriate for even an eco-
nomically oriented court to refuse to defer to the copyright owner, and 
instead make an independent weighing of how enforcing the copyright in 
the given instance would affect welfare, and any other relevant consequen-
tialist or nonconsequentialist policies. 
113 I am indebted here to Alan Feld. 
114 This belief is rather controversial. See, e.g., such classic sources on the debate 
as the Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV. 
485 (1980) and RICHARD A. PosNER, THE EcoNOMICS OF JusncE 48-115 
(1981) for further discussion of the question of whether utilitarianism and 
economics are truly linked in this way. 
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VIII. RECONSIDERING THE "SUBSTANTIAL INJURY" 
HURDLE TO FAIR USE 
In Fair Use as Market Failure, I argued that fair use was and should be 
granted only if a three-part test were satisfied: that (1) defendant could 
not appropriately purchase the desired use through the market; (2) trans-
ferring control over the use to defendant would serve the public interest; 
and (3) the copyright owner's incentives would not be substantially im-
paired by allowing the user to proceed.115 This current article is consistent 
with the first two prongs, but I would like to reconsider the third prong, 
the substantial injury hurdle, under which substantial injury to the plain-
tiffs incentives should ordinarily bar fair use. 
As Neil Netanel has pointed out, the third prong of the test effectively 
forces all inquiries to be subordinated to the economic.116 Yet there are 
instances where noneconomic values will be more important - a possibil-
ity for which the substantial injury hurdle leaves no scope. Since the whole 
point of singling out "justifications" is to help us see the occasions on 
which judges give fair use because economic value is not the proper met-
ric, the excuse/justification distinction helped me understand that substan-
tial injury to the plaintiff need not preclude fair use in all cases. In cases of 
"justification,'' we sometimes tolerate such injury in pursuit of other goals. 
IX WHAT HAPPENS TO FAIR USE WHEN TRANSACTION 
COSTS DECREASE 
In cases where fair use is premised on high transaction costs between 
owner and user, as arguably occurred in the Williams & Wilkins and per-
haps even in the Universal City Studios cases,117 the precedent is vulnera-
115 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2. 
116 Netanel, supra note 7, at 330-31. (Thanks to Tom McNulty for this formulation 
of Netanel's point.) 
117 The following chart depicts the results in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United 
States, 203 Ct. Cl. 74 (1973), aff d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 
(1975) (per curiam) and Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 463 U.S. 417 (1983): 
No permission 
No compensation 
Behavior 
Potentially 
Justified 
W&Wor 
SONY 
Potentially 
Excused 
W&Wor 
SONY 
W&Wor 
SONY 
Defendant loses 
The next chart depicts Williams & Wilkins and Universal Studios v Sony as 
they could have been decided if the court had decided to "make a market" 
by imposing a monetary-only remedy: 
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ble to shifts in the institutional and transactional landscape: If changes 
occur that lower the transaction costs (whether through collecting socie-
ties, technological devices, or otherwise), the increased ease in transacting 
should and does result in a lessened availability of the fair use defense.118 
This is appropriate, as I recognized in my original piece.119 If fair use was 
granted because market conditions made it hard to consult the owner, but 
a market remained desirable, then there is every reason to return to rely-
ing on the market when owner and user are put in a position where they 
can consult. Relying on the market means fully enforcing the copyright. 
In short, in many cases of "excuse" it will be possible for the facts to 
alter in a way that eliminates the desirability of fair use treatment. But the 
same is not true of cases of justification, for it is hard to see any factual 
change that could transform a decision governed by non-economic norms 
into something the market could adequately handle. 120 
No permission 
No compensation 
Behavior 
Potentially 
Justified 
W&Wor 
SONY 
Potentially 
Excused 
W&Wor 
SONY 
Defendant loses 
W&Wor 
SONY 
.. 
118 See, e.g., three cases m which the availab1hty of potential hcensmg helped per-
suade the courts against fair use: Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 
913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994); Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 
Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir, 1996); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. 
Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1173-78 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). A graph for them 
would look as follows: 
Texaco and Princeton Documents and Britannica: 
No .E_ermission 
No compensation 
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x 
The Britannica case is discussed in Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, 
at 1629. For commentaries on how cases like Texaco may affect my Market 
Failure analysis, see, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Can the Internet Shrink Fair 
Use?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 880 (1999); Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The 
Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 
76 N.C. L. Rev. 557 (1998); Loren, Redefining The Market Failure Approach 
To Fair Use In An Era Of Copyright Permission Systems, supra note 2; 
Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 2. 
119 Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1629 & note 159 and 1645-57. 
120 See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JusTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EouALITY (1983). He argues that to maintain some equality, it is necessary 
that some goods (e.g., political office) remain unavailable for purchase by 
money. By contrast, the instant article stresses relations rather than things. 
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Although market malfunctions can be curable, it is important to avoid 
exaggerating the extent to which even "excuse" cases will disappear. Con-
sider the promise that the Internet and collecting societies may offer for 
lowering transaction costs. Much argument has centered on whether trans-
action costs will in fact grow low enough to allow markets to form between 
copyright owners and at-home occasional users, and what the impact will 
be on fair use.121 But for all the debate, it must be stressed most cases of 
fair use are premised on factors other than transaction-cost barriers that 
keep copyright owner and potential licensee apart, and some of these 
other factors can be relevant to home copying. For example, a judicial and 
legislative unwillingness to impose copyright liability on individual at-
home users has other, converging explanations, such as the desire to pre-
serve privacy122 and maintain a feeling of community.123 These concerns 
will not disappear in the face of a reduction in transaction costs. Thus, 
many cases of excuse contain facts that are inextricably intertwined with 
non-economic normative judgments. 
The latter point can be seen by considering the "external benefit" 
generated by a historian, critic or scholar who reproduces someone's 
words or images. In analyzing the case, we can move back and forth be-
tween the market and non-market normative realms. Let us focus on a 
scholar like the defendant in Time v. Geis who needs to copy some copy-
righted text or image to convey his point. One way to look at the scholar's 
quandary is through the lens of justification: that he is furthering public 
debate in a way that is not monetizable. However, one could also see his 
position through the lens of excuse - that even if the benefits the scholar 
generates are capable of being put into monetary terms, the scholar's 
pocketbook is unlikely to reflect much of that benefit. Those benefits will 
remain external to him, so he will be unlikely to offer a license fee high 
enough to reflect the social benefit at issue. Conceivably the scholar's 
book could earn a million-dollar advance, which would "cure" the exter-
nality problem. But in reality, scholarly books rarely ever internalize much 
of the social benefit they generate, so that this kind of fair use is likely to 
be durable despite factual changes. The benefit given to the public by the 
historian, critic or scholar is unlikely ever to be reflected in his or her 
As Margaret Jane Radin has pointed out, see Justice and the Market Domain, 
supra note 40, most of our life involves a mix of market and nonmarket 
relations, even in connection with the same objects. 
121 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 117; Kitch, supra note 118; Loren, supra note 2. 
122 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law In Copyright's Image, 22 
U. DAYTON L. REv. 587 {1997) {discussing privacy concerns). 
123 Maintaining gift relationships can be particularly important to maintaining ar-
tistic community and vibrancy. See LEWIS HYDE, THE Gwr: IMAGINATION 
AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY 47, 272-82 {1983). 
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pocket.124 And even if the historian, critic or scholar who· quotes from a 
copyrighted work did capture a significant amount of the benefit she gen-
erates, a normative economist might still suggest exempting her from hav-
ing to obtain permission from her target: Judge Posner has suggested that, 
"The social product is diminished if persons are able to exact compensa-
tion from truthful critics of their failings, for such a right reduces the in-
centive to produce truth. "125 One might add that. the availability of 
receiving compensation from critics could also decrease the ordinary disin-
centives to produce flawed work. 
For all these reasons, even market malfunction is not always curable. 
Many externalities will be unaffected by technological and institutional 
change. Further, many "excuse" cases are intertwined with issues of 
justification. 
X A POSSIBLE DANGER OF MY APPROACH 
In copyright law, judges have developed a complex, largely unarticu-
lated network of defenses under the rubric of "fair use."126 This article 
suggests that, paralleling the common law distinction, some fair use cases 
124 See Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1607, 1630-31 ("In cases of 
externalities, then, the potential user may wish to produce socially meritori-
ous new works by using some of the copyright owner's material, yet be una-
ble to purchase permission because the market structure prevents him from 
being able to capitalize on the benefits to be realized." Id. at 1631). See also 
Loren, supra note 2. 
125 Richard A Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 74 (1992). 
In the quoted passage, Judge Posner seems to be mixing norms. He seems to 
view truth as something whose value is absolute, rather than as something 
whose value is dependent on market preferences, but then he seems to use 
a purely economic model for its production. This is intriguing. Real-world 
policymakers do indeed regularly choose "goods" by means of nonmarket 
criteria, and then turn to pragmatic tools, including the economic, in order 
to secure the production of the good. 
Possibly Judge Posner is responding to the fact that "perfect information" 
(truth) is one of the pre-conditions for a perfect market. James Boyle has 
suggested that markets for information cannot be well addressed through a 
neoclassical lens since that lens presupposes an abundant supply of informa-
tion whose scarcity is in fact something that needs to be remedied. JAMES 
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUC-
TION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996). While I do not share Boyle's 
pessimism about the uselessness of economics here - after all, no system 
can be validated by terms entirely within itself - he is right to emphasize 
that for a market, information has the dual role of precondition and 
product. 
126 In copyright law, a defendant is liable if her work is "substantially similar" to, 
and copied from, the plaintiffs copyrighted work. A finding that "substan-
tial similarity" is lacking constitutes another place where doctrine hides a 
complex network of defenses and limitations. 
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involve "excuse" and some involve "justification." Because changes in cir-
cumstances are relevant to "excuse" in a way they are not to "justifica-
tion," the distinction between the categories is particularly important for 
areas of law like copyright that involve rapid technological and institu-
tional change .. Some recent confusion may result from conflating cases of 
excuse and justification together.127 
My analysis is not impaired by the fact that courts do not explicitly 
distinguish between justified and excused fair uses. What the common law 
judges accomplished over several centuries, copyright judges have had to 
develop over a much shorter time. It is no wonder that the separately de-
lineated defenses of the common law are collapsed together in the copy-
right area, where the time to elaborate and distinguish the defenses has 
been so condensed. 
The main problem with the analysis that I offer is that it leaves a 
myriad of decision points open for judges to resolve. Look at all the deci-
sions that are open, and must be made by someone: 
Someone (probably a judge, but "fair use" is usually considered a 
mixed question of law and fact) has to decide whether a defendant's use 
implicates only monetary values. Even if it is decided that the use imple-
ments solely monetary values, the Someone then has to decide whether or 
not the market can implement those values. If it is decided that the market 
suffices to achieve value maximization, then the plaintiff's right is en-
forced. If market norms are applicable but the particular market cannot be 
relied on, then the Someone has to decide whether the defendant's behav-
ior is socially desirable on an economic metric, and, employing the same 
metric, whether it is appropriate that the plaintiff's consent was not sought 
and whether the defendant should pay compensation. 
Conversely, the Someone may decide that the defendant's use does 
not implicate only monetary values. If so, then that Someone needs to 
address the values that are involved, and do so in relation to the three 
questions of behavior, permission and compensation. 
The analysis makes clear - perhaps too clear - how many norma-
tive decisions the law of "fair use" requires. But the current doctrinal for-
mulations for fair use involve no fewer normative choices - the choices 
are merely better hidden. 
I do not think that requiring explicit normative choice means leading 
judges into a realm of pure judicial legislation. Rather, it leads them into a 
121 Thus, persons who believe that a decrease in transaction costs can eliminate 
fair use treatment may be seeing everything in terms of a narrowly-defined 
"excuse" type market malfunction, and ignoring the possibilities of justified 
fair use. 
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field of subtle cues that a judge can employ to navigate.128 Nevertheless, it 
can be objected that such openness leaves the law too vulnerable to partic-
ular judges' idiosyncrasies. I know of no better preventative than to try to 
classify and define the choices involved, and the taxonomy of this article is 
intended as a contribution to that end. 
Lawyers have known, at least since the Legal Realists and probably 
since law began, that the neutrality of the law is only partial, and that 
normative choice influences virtually all hard decisions. Is it more useful to 
explicitly name and organize those value choices, or is it better to promote 
law's perceived legitimacy by hiding them? That is, alas, an open question 
of its own. I suggest that much good can come from exposing the pluralism 
of our norms, even if that means the populace then loses its illusion that 
the law operates like a machine. Any narrower inquiry could impose great 
harm on nonmarket values, particularly free speech, and that would im-
pose an even greater cost. 
XI. CAVEAT: THOUGHTS ON THE ISSUE OF FULL FAIR USE 
VERSUS COMPENSATION 
When a judge faces a fair use inquiry, she knows after Acuff-Rose129 
that she has several options in regard to remedy. She can refuse an injunc-
tion (because she finds the defendant's use socially desirable and finds the 
neglect of the owner's veto power excusable or justifiable), but she is nev-
ertheless free to give the plaintiff a reasonable royalty or other compensa-
tion. This is equivalent to the judge "making a market": the judge can 
decrease transaction costs by creating new points of contact between the 
parties. It can also be seen as a judicially imposed compulsory license. 
Traditionally, judges in fair use cases faced a binary choice: either find 
fair use and give the plaintiff no remedy at all, or find infringement and 
give the plaintiff both injunctive and monetary relief. Now that their dis-
cretion is explicitly enlarged, should judges in fair use cases routinely give 
compensation to the plaintiff? Should they ever do so? A "compensation-
only" or "liability rule" approach has the virtue of apparent compromise: 
it appears to encourage dissemination and discourse, while simultaneously 
preserving incentives. 
The liability-rule approach is so attractive, that we may ask whether 
all copyright cases should be open to this route. In doing so, we must be 
wary of a likely corollary: if injunctions disappear in favor of monetary 
rewards, the scope of copyright is likely to expand. Congress has already 
been remarkably generous to the "copyright industries" (entertainment, 
128 See, e.g., Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& Pus. PoL'Y 807, 810-11 (2000). 
129 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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media, and so on) at the expense of the public domain.130 The demise of 
injunctions would let industry lobbyists more easily argue in favor of even 
greater copyright extensions. If so, much that is currently free will come to 
bear a price tag. Is this bad? 
Of the many lessons the commodification literature has to teach copy-
right lawyers and theorists, let me single out two strands relevant to this 
issue. First, Titmuss in his classic and controversial work, The Gift Rela-
tionship, 131 suggested that for some products, quality degrades when they 
are commodified. His focus was on the market for human blood. 
His research suggested that switching from a donor system to a sale 
system degraded the quality of the blood available for transfusions. People 
who sell blood are both likely to have questionable health histories (drug 
use corresponds with poverty) and a reason to lie about that health his-
tory. By contrast, people who donate blood are more likely to be healthy, 
and have fewer motives to lie. 
Second, Titmuss and others have shown that over-commodification 
can have deleterious systemic effects. Thus, if a large proportion of blood 
begins to come from monetary purchase, the sheen of donative merit that 
now attaches to voluntary blood donation may diminish. Anything having 
to do with transfers of blood may begin to acquire an unsavory reputation, 
and voluntary donations may slow. 
For a more dramatic example of deleterious systemic effect, consider 
the following, drawn in part from a hefty science-fiction literature on com-
modification. If human organs could be freely bought and sold, persons 
might imperil their health in the efforts to help their families economically; 
people might make irreversible choices they come to regret because they 
may be unable to predict the way their preferences might be affected by 
selling parts of themselves; murders might increase as organ-flappers went 
into the chop-shop business. Even the state might increase the scope of 
crimes deemed worthy of capital punishment.132 
130 See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 
CORNELL L. REv. 857, 870-79 (1987); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright 
Grab, WIRED, Jan. 4, 1996, at 134. 
131 RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO 
SocIAL Poucy (1972). Whether or not Titmuss was correct as an empirical 
matter, the question of product quality is well raised by him. 
132 In the future society of one science fiction story, a series of traffic violations 
was enough cause to sentence the violator to death, making his body availa-
ble to the governmental organ banks. Larry Niven, The Jigsaw Man, in 
DANGEROUS V1s10Ns 218-29 (Harlan Ellison ed., 1983). Consider also the 
recent revelations concerning China's use of executed prisoners. Craig G. 
Smith, On Death Row, China's Source of Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 
2001, at Al. (Thanks to David Koh for bringing this material to my 
attention.) 
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Given the great attraction that the "no injunction/money only" rem-
edy holds for copyright, we should consider some of its dangers. What 
kind of quality degradation or deleterious systemic effects could eventuate 
if liability-rule judgments of "compensation only" drastically increased? 
Let us look at an extreme: assume that fair use as free use disappears, that 
copyright expands, and that most of the public's current rights to "copy 
and to use"133 have become conditional on payment. 
Theresa Amabile and other social psychologists have determined that 
in some contexts, external motivation in the form of rewards can decrease 
the quality of creative work. Emphasizing monetary relief could conceiva-
bly have this effect. Injunctive relief is a "natural" outgrowth of an au-
thor's creating a work; with creation comes an instinct for control. If 
instead an author could only expect money, her perception of her task -
and the quality of what she produces - could degrade.134 
What of systemic effects? Imagine that technology increased to such 
an extent that all uses we made of each other's works would automatically 
trigger a change in our bank balances, and that copyright law had evolved 
to require payment on all such occasions. If I quote you - even a quote 
that would have been fair use to a prior generation - a nickel or a dollar 
flows from my account to yours. If I quote from a book written long ago 
- even a book that would have been in the public domain had there been 
no series of laws extending the copyright term - a nickel or dollar flows 
from my account to the account of the authors' heirs. This is quite differ-
ent from what happens today. But if in fact I have experienced monetary 
benefit in the amount of that nickel or dollar, would it not be safe to make 
me pay? After all, in such a case requiring payment will not impose a net 
harm. Yet even if the recipient is ordered to pay only a portion of the 
monetary benefit he or she has earned, some danger remains. 
My space here is obviously too short to explore all the difficulties that 
might result with a regime where we pay for all the monetary benefits we 
receive from others. One salient danger is that a requirement of ubiqui-
tous payment may erode everyone's sense of indebtedness to the commu-
133 The phrase is Justice O'Connor's. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989). 
134 Admittedly, the experiments of Amabile and her colleague are too limited to 
allow firm conclusions, particularly regarding adult artists. TERESA M. 
AMABILE ET AL, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT: UPDATE TO THE SocIAL Psy. 
CHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY 171-77 (1996). Further, my argument applies to 
works that are owned by their creators. For the large numbers of works 
written in work for hire contexts, monetization has to some extent already 
occurred. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that a right to control can have effects different from a 
right to be paid, even outside the realm of creativity. See Rachlinsky & 
Jourden, supra note 107. 
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nity. In the literature on what motivates political morality, 135 the 
perception of reciprocity is key.136 One reason we pay taxes without a 
policeman breathing down our shirts is that we see benefits the govern-
ment gives us, and gives to others who in turn may benefit us. Our legal 
system would fall apart if we only paid taxes, and obeyed other laws, when 
a policeman looks over our shoulder. A pervasive system where we pay 
for each bit of what we use could give us the illusion that we are not net 
recipients. (I say "illusion," for only the labor and insights of generations 
has protected us from lives nasty, brutish and short. There is no way we 
can pay everyone we owe.) From this illusion that we have paid for every-
thing we have, could come an unwillingness to give back to the community 
and an unwillingness to obey its laws. 
CONCLUSION 
On some occasions a market's malfunctions or limitations will make it 
an unreliable institution for furthering social goals. A court should accord-
ingly avoid awarding an automatic and absolute deference to an owner's 
market strength in such cases. Rather, the court must directly examine the 
merits: Should the behavior (copying, adaptation, or other use of the copy-
righted work) go forward? Should the defendant have asked plaintiff for 
permission? Should the defendant have paid? The court may decide that 
the copyist's decision to proceed without compensation or permission was 
justified or excused (and award fair use treatment), or the court may de-
cide the defendant's decisions were unjustified and not excused (and im-
pose liability). Fair use is at bottom a procedural device: it sorts through 
the bulk of cases to find the few where a detailed and equitable inquiry is 
likely to be advisable. 
Thus, it should be stressed that the presence of market malfunction or 
inherent limitation does not compel a court to conclude that the defen-
dant's use is privileged. Rather, the presence of these danger signals 
merely tells the legal system it should substitute a detailed inquiry for its 
usual automatic deference to a property owner's will. 
On some occasions, the market's inherent limitations make it untrust-
worthy; perhaps non-economic norms are important to the particular dis-
pute, or perhaps non-monetizable interests are at stake, or perhaps there 
is a danger that market interactions will erode social goodwill and the pro-
ductivity it enables. On such occasions, we might say the market is inher-
ently limited and that departures from it are potentially "justified." 
On other occasions, economic norms are the only goals at issue and 
the market mode of exchange appropriate, so that the market is a pre-
135 The phrase is Goodin's. See ROBERT E. GooDIN, MOTIVATING POLITICAL 
MORALITY (1992). 
136 Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333 {2001). 
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sumptively useful way to proceed. Even then, however, the presumption 
can be defeated: Sometimes the market cannot be relied upon to direct a 
resource to its highest valued use because the conditions for perfect com-
petition are absent. This is market malfunction. In such cases, a copyist 
may be "excused" for not having sought a copyright owner's permission. 
In both cases, it may still happen that a judge will decide that the 
copyist should be considered an infringer. The point is that the decision 
should be based on something more than a mere failure to obtain the 
copyright owner's consent. 
Loosely, one can associate market malfunctions such as high transac-
tion costs with "excuse," and inherent market limitations - where other, 
non-market norms should govern - with notions of "justification." The 
existence of the two categories emphasizes the multiplicity of ways in 
which markets can fail to do the tasks the law assigns them. Markets can 
be unreliable modes of achieving social goals even when a potential buyer 
and seller are face-to-face, and even where no transaction costs arise be-
tween them. 
In cases where markets are unreliable devices for achieving social 
goals, a court may sometimes deny an injunction (to allow a socially valua-
ble use to go forward), yet nevertheless order compensation. As is fairly 
well acknowledged in the literature, there are both strengths and weak-
nesses in such judicial equivalents to compulsory licensing. However, I 
have suggested additional possible dangers in this otherwise-tempting 
approach. 
In particular, a judge who awards a money-only remedy may succumb 
to the illusion that her monetary award will have no adverse consequences 
for Free Speech and democratic interchange. If so, with the decline in in-
junctive relief we are likely to see an expansion in the scope of copyright. 
For example, judges may be more likely to characterize small takings as 
infringements, and more likely to characterize contested territory as 
owned "expression" rather than free "idea." The dunning of the public 
that might result could, in time, change the citizen's relationship to her 
cultural heritage and to her society as a whole. This is not only true of 
audiences. Creators who stand to collect the fees may come to feel that 
society values their artistic stake only in cash terms, which could erode the 
artists' own sense of dignity and intrinsic purpose. New generations of cre-
ators, who often need to quote from their predecessors' work, might find 
their relations to the artistic canon shifting in unproductive ways. A bu-
reaucratic assessment of even a penny-per-pound could dampen the com-
plex set of spontaneous emotions (such as gratitude) that often stimulates 
the best of new growth. 
In short, with the demise of the injunction we are likely to see an 
expansion in other aspects of copyright. As a result we may drift into a 
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cash-and-carry mode of social interaction that could be destructive of crea-
tivity, community and respect for law. 
